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Untenable Status of Corporate Governance 
Listing Standards Under the Securities 
Exchange Act 
By Douglas C. Michael· 
INTRODUCTION 
United States securities markets operate under a system of supervised self-
regulation! created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).2 
-Mr. Michael is a member of the California and District of Columbia bars and is an Assistant 
Professor at the University of Kentucky School of Law. During the relevant periods discussed in this 
article, Mr. Michael was a Staff Attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was 
the respondent in the Business Roundtable v. SEC, and later an associate at the firm retained by the 
petitioner in that same case. He did not represent either party in the litigation, and the opinions and 
conclusions expressed herein are, of course, entirely his own and based on public information. He 
gratefully acknowledges the efforts of Paul Wyciskala and Steven Wheeler of the New York Stock 
Exchange and Michael Emen of the American Stock Exchange in providing access to historical 
documents at their respective institutions and in their thoughtful responses to requests for additional 
information. 
1. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (referring to this "unique system of 
self-regulation"); Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, Securities Industry Study, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1973) [hereinafter 
1973 Securities Industry Study] (same); Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, H. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., PI. 4 at 501 (1963) 
[hereinafter 1963 Special Study] (the SEC "is not only regulator, but also supervisor of 'selr-
regulators"). Professor Seligman termed supervised self-regulation "one of the most significant 
concepts in securities regulation" and "a thread that unites several aspects of the [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission's broad jurisdiction." Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 
439 (1982). 
The Commission's role as supervisor of self-regulation has been analyzed and discussed widely. 
See, e.g., David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When? A 
Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for the Securities Markets, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
527 (1983) (suggesting that "supervised self-regulation" is only partially descriptive, and proposing 
guidelines for when the Commission should use its direct regulatory authority); Walter Werner, 
The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 Va. L. Rev. 755, 779-83 (1984) (criticizing the Commission's 
relative inactivity in its role as market regulator) .. 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. "[T]he Exchange 
Act created government-supervised self-regulation." Sam S. Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities 
Markets: A Critical Examination, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 853, 869 (1985). 
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That system includes substantive regulation of the traders and the issuers of 
securities traded in those markets through the use of listing standards. 3 
These listing standards have a unique status. They are part of a self-
regulatory system, but are not classic self-regulation. The markets do not govern 
the traders of which it consists; rather, it governs outsiders-the issuers. The 
markets4 and the Securities and Exchange Commissions have sought to control 
issuers in ways not clearly related to trading in the market by imposing 
"corporate governance" listing standards.6 
The first judicial consideration of these corporate governance listing stan-
dards came only recently, upon review of Exchange Act Rule 19c-4 (Rule 19c-
4), a voting rights standard promulgated by the Commission in 1988.7 In 
Business Roundtable v. SEC,s the court invalidated Rule 19c-4 because it was 
not consistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act. Consistency with the 
Exchange Act is a requirement imposed upon Commission-promulgated rules 
by section 19(c) of the Act. In tortured dictum, however, the court created a 
theory to save the marketplaces' ability to impose corporate governance listing 
standards. 
This Article argues that the more logical and correct result is to admit that 
corporate governance listing standards have no place in marketplace rules, 
whether promulgated by the Commission or by the markets themselves. These 
standards were not designed to protect shareholders, but originated primarily as 
marketing campaigns by the exchanges. They cannot stand against Congress' 
clear command in the Exchange Act that rules, whether of the Commission or 
the markets, must be consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Act. 
3. Listing standards are the requirements of each registered securities exchange applicable to 
securities sought to be listed for trading on that exchange and to the issuer of that security as well. 
See infra note 9. Some of these standards, listed in detail infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text, 
appear as criteria for listing a security, and others simply are "rules," "policies" or "suggestions" of 
an exchange applicable to issuers of already-listed securities. 
4. For the purpose of this Article, the term "markets" means The New York Stock Exchange, 
Inc. [hereinafter NYSE] and the American Stock Exchange, Inc. [hereinafter Amex], both national 
securities exchanges registered under § 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988). "Markets" 
also refers to the National Association of Securities Dealers' [hereinafter NASD] Automated 
Quotation System [hereinafter NASDAQ]' the sole "national securities association" registered 
under § 15A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1988). The NYSE and the Amex account for 
virtually all of the securities listed for trading on United States securities exchanges (91.4% by 
number and 99.8% by market value of all common and preferred stocks listed on exchanges as of 
December 31,1988 were listed on these two exchanges). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
55th Annual Report 139-40 (1989). NASDAQ is the only other market which offers liquidity 
competitive with the exchanges. See infra note 9. Thus, these three institutions set standards for 
most of the issuers of securities traded in the United States. 
5. The system of supervised self-regulation, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, establishes 
the Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter Commission or SEC] as the supervisor. See 
Securities Exchange Act §§ 6(b), 15A(b) and 19(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 780-3(b), 78s(a) (1988). 
6. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (definition of "qualitative" listing standards). 
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1991), adopted in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, 53 
Fed. Reg. 26,376 (1988). 
8. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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More importantly, a world without marketplace-imposed standards likely 
would not be detrimental to corporations or shareholders. 
The first section of this Article defines "corporate governance" listing stan-
dards and traces their development in each major marketplace and traces the 
development of the federal securities laws governing listing standards. The 
second section reviews the history of Rule 19c-4 and the Business Roundtable 
opinion, and concludes that the court's dictum, which would permit markets to 
impose corporate governance listing standards, is inconsistent with the Ex-
change Act and is unworkable. Finally, the third section describes a world 
without corporate governance listing standards aDd explains how any attempt to 
remove them likely will be made only by the Commission. 
DEVELOPMENT OF LISTING STANDARDS 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS 
DEFINED 
Listing standards are the requirements placed upon issuers whose securities 
are listed and traded on a national securities exchange under section 12 of the 
Exchange Act.9 A listing standard usually is intended to facilitate an efficient, 
continuous auction market by setting minimum numerical standards for capital-
ization, number of shares and shareholders,1O or by establishing disclosure 
req uirements. II Other listing standards, however, do not affect the trading 
market directly, but are concerned with corporate governance, that is, "the 
relationship between the management of public corporations and their share-
holders."12 Table 1 lists the major corporate governance standards currently 
9. "Listing" actually is a parallel process of approval of a security by the exchange for trading 
there, and registration of the security with the Commission under the Exchange Act. See Exchange 
Act § 12(d), 15 U.S.C. 781(d) (1988); NYSE, Listed Company Manual 7-6 (1986) [hereinafter 
NYSE Listed Company Manual]. 
The term "national securities exchange" is used in § 6(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) 
(1988), to refer to any exchange registered under the Act, and includes the registered regional 
exchanges as well as the NYSE and the Amex. 
For purposes of this Article, "listing standards" include the standards adopted by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for securities to be designated as "national market system" 
[hereinafter NMS or NASDAQ/NMS] securities. See infra note 92 and accompanying text 
(discussion of mechanics of NMS designation). Although the NASD is not a national securities 
exchange, nor are securities "listed" on NASDAQ/NMS within the meaning of § 12, "only 
NASDAQ's National Market System offers sufficient over-the-counter liquidity to compete with 
the NYSE or [American Stock Exchange]." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class 
Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 70 n.207 (1988). 
10. See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, 1-1 to 1-5 (1990); Amex, Company Guide 1-1 to 
1-6 (1992) [hereinafter Amex Company Guide]; NASD, Schedule D to the Bylaws, pt. III, § 4(a), 
reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) ~ 1811 (1991). 
11. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, 2-6 to 2-9 (1986); Amex Company Guide, 6-1 to 6-2 
(1988); NASD, supra note 10, § 5(b), NASD Manual ~ 1812 at 1574-75 (1991) (annual and 
quarterly reports). 
12. Roberta Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting 
Rights, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 809, 814 (1987); see also Comment, Stock Exchange Listing 
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promulgated by the nation's major securities markets, which are the focus of this
Article.
The word "standard" implies more objectivity than actually exists in many
cases. Some listing standards are cast as mere guidelines, expectations or
suggestions.' 3 This makes the actual binding rule or effect difficult to discern.
14
In addition, facially objective rules have their ambiguities."5 Notwithstanding
such generalities, most corporate governance listing standards were developed in
specific response to an identified problem. Such problems, however, were not
Agreements as a Vehicle for Corporate Governance, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1427, 1434 (1981) (citing as
examples "provisions that affect corporate conduct in areas such as voting power, matters required
to be voted upon by shareholders ... [and] classes of directors").
One standard particularly difficult to classify is the requirement of profitability. Both the NYSE
and the Amex require demonstrated profitability of the issuer at the time of listing its security. The
Amex standard is less stringent, however, and may even allow listing under "alternative criteria"
with no specific profitability requirement. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, 102 (1989); Amex
Company Guide, 1-1 to 1-2 (1988). Although these clearly are numerical or quantitative criteria,
they have little to do with an efficient trading market and do not address the corporation-
shareholder relationship as do corporate governance standards.
13. One example of this variety is the NYSE Listed Company Manual's standard on concentra-
tion of voting power.
IT]he concentration of a substantial proportion of a common stock issue in one holding, or in
several affiliated holdings is not necessarily an obstacle to the listing of a company's securities.
However, in considering its listing, the Exchange will take into account the proportion of the
total voting power represented by such concentrated holdings.
NYSE Listed Company Manual, 3-2 (1986). The factors other than numerical standards to be
considered in determining eligibility for listing are even less clear.
Although the amount of assets and earnings and the aggregate market value are considerations,
greater emphasis is placed on questions such as the degree of national interest in the company,
the character of the market for its products, its relative stability and position in its industry, and
whether or not it is engaged in an expanding industry with prospects for maintaining its
position.
Id. at 1-2 (1989).
In contrast, the NYSE requirement for annual meetings is succinct and clear. "Listed companies
are required to hold an annual shareholders' meeting during each fiscal year." Id. at 3-1 (1986).
14. To put it succinctly, these standards are "essentially devoid of content." Joel Seligman,
Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687, 700 (1986). For example, consider the NYSE Listed Company Manual's
"long standing commitment to encourage high standards of corporate democracy ... [requiring]
every listed company ... to follow certain practices aimed at maintaining appropriate standards of
corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders." NYSE Listed Company
Manual, 3-1 (1986). Professor Seligman notes that "[ilt is far from obvious what, in fact, these
standards mean; nor has the NYSE Listed Company Manual based its policy on a principle or
theory that could clarify the ambiguities in the policy." Seligman, supra, at 700.
15. For example, the Amex's specific listing requirements for capitalization, net income, and
number of shareholders, are followed by the general disclaimer that "an application may be
approved even though the company does not meet all of the numerical guidelines." Amex Company
Guide, 1-1 (1988). In reviewing these Amex numerical standards, the Commission noted that they
"are not always dispositive of a company's application for listing." Exchange Act Release No.
24,043, 52 Fed. Reg. 4071, 4071 n.1 (1987).
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those of the listed companies, but rather those of the exchanges themselves, as
seen in the following section.
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING
STANDARDS
The history of listing standards spans almost one hundred years. Table 1 lists
the respective dates of adoption by each securities market of the major corporate
governance listing standards.
NYSE
A history of corporate governance listing standards must primarily focus on
the NYSE. Although other securities exchanges have been active during the
NYSE's history, none has achieved the status and market dominance of the
NYSE to be able to impose requirements on the issuers of securities traded
there.' 6 Corporate governance listing standards, as discussed below, developed
in the NYSE at three distinct times: the first standards appeared in the early
history of listing agreements, from 1900 through the 1920s; the second group of
standards appeared in the 1950s; and a later significant standard was added in
1977.
Originally, any security could be "listed" on the exchange. The first limita-
tions on the addition of stocks to the list called for trading appears in the
constitution of the NYSE's predecessor adopted in 1856.17 It is the listing
agreement, however, developed just prior to the turn of the century, 8 which
made listing "standards" possible. The first "standards" were no more than
terms inserted in a given listing agreement. 19 The standards were set as general
rules, but developed on a case-by-case basis, each listing agreement differing
slightly from the last as new policies were developed or as the individual
16. See generally George Garvy, Rivals and Interlopers in the History of the New York Security
Mhrket, 52 J. Pol. Econ. 128 (1944).
17. The Committee on Securities was later formed in 1861 to oversee additions to the list. Birl E.
Shultz, Stock Exchange Procedure 11-12 (1936). The first requests for financial information date
from 1866. See J. P. Livingston, The American Stockholder 178 (1958). The Committee on Stock
List, the current NYSE Listed Company Manual committee which oversees its listing standards,
succeeded the Committee on Securities and dates from the 1869 merger between the New York
Stock Exchange Board, the Open Board of Brokers and the Government Bond Department, which
created the modern NYSE. Richard J. Teweles & Edward S. Bradley, The Stock Market 105 (4th
ed. 1982); Shultz, supra, at 14; J. Edward Meeker, The Work of the Stock Exchange 68-69 (rev.
ed. 1930).
18. The first such agreements were entered into in 1897; see Birl E. Shultz, The Securities
Market and How It Works 14 (1942). By 1899, these agreements had become "a regular part of the
listing procedure." NYSE Listed Company Manual, 7-4 (1988).
19. See Schultz, supra note 18, at 36. For Schultz's chronicle of the development of terms in
listing agreements from the early 1900s, see Schultz, supra note 17, at 18-22.
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circumstances of each applicant required.2" The listing standards commonly are
referred to as "rules," 2' but they are not necessarily uniform, and even today not
every issuer of listed securities is subject to the same rules.22
The NYSE first was broadly successful in requiring financial information
from listed companies as early as 1895,23 but could not impose strict standards
on listed companies because listing was not a requirement for trading at the
exchange. Earnest development of standards, therefore, began only after the
NYSE's abolition of its "Unlisted Department" in 1910.24 The initial focus of
20. Meeker, supra note 17, at 93-94; Shultz, supra note 17, at 36; Teweles & Bradley, supra
note 17, at 106. For a discussion of several specific incidents which led to NYSE "rules," see
Livingston, supra note 17, at 182-89.
21. At first glance, it may seem problematic whether ad hoc provisions in listing agreements rise
to the status of "rules." Regardless of their initial status, each of the listing standards discussed in
this article have been promulgated by the NYSE Listed Company Manual in its Listed Company
Manual and thus are considered "rules" under the Exchange Act, as defined by § 3(a)(27), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(27) (1988) and Rule 19b-4(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(b) (1991). The Business
Roundtable court considered and rejected the argument that listing standards, no matter how much
they may be rules in form, concern subjects beyond those regulated by the Exchange Act and thus
are not "rules" under the Act. See infra note 159.
22. See Teweles & Bradley, supra note 17, at 109 which states that:
Companies could be held only to agreements that they had signed, some of which had been
entered into very many years before. If new and additional agreements were formulated by the
Exchange, old listed companies could not be compelled to comply except by Exchange
persuasion or if they applied for further listing of stock.
Id.; see also 1963 Special Study, supra note 1, at 566 ("[Dlifferent companies are bound by different
agreements, depending upon when they last listed shares. However, the [New York Stock]
Exchange urges companies which have not signed the current listing agreement to comply with its
provisions, and asserts the authority to take action for failure by these companies to comply.").
23. See Livingston, supra note 17, at 181.
24. The Unlisted Department was created in 1885. "[Tlhe New York Stock Exchange was at
that time mainly a railroad market .... IT]he Exchange ... created an Unlisted Department...
where the new industrial shares which could not altogether meet the increasingly strict require-
ments of the Committee on Stock List could nevertheless be admitted for trading purposes."
Meeker, supra note 17, at 71. The public had become dissatisfied with the performance of rail stocks
but "had shown a disposition to buy" the industrials. Francis L. Eames, The New York Stock
Exchange 64 (1894). The NYSE sought to capture business which was going to other markets, but
"[uinfortunately for the speculating public, it proved a handy tool for bankers and promoters who
were thus able to place behind unsound stocks of untried companies the prestige of the New York
Stock Exchange." Humphrey B. Neill, The Inside Story of The Stock Exchange 122 n.1 (1950).
Because no information at all was required of unlisted issues, "[m]any of the most notorious
manipulations may be ascribed to the 'convenience' of the unlisted department." Id. at 122. In 1909,
a "Committee on Speculation in Securities and Commodities" established by New York Governor
Charles E. Hughes, recommended in its report, among other things, that unlisted trading on the
NYSE Listed Company Manual be abolished. W. C. Van Antwerp, The Stock Exchange From
Within 415, 425 (1913).
The abolition of the Unlisted Department in 1910 "[set] the Exchange right with the public by
ridding [it] of anything approaching the blind pools of early days and at the same time forcing
certain wealthy corporations to abandon their policy of concealment or lose the privilege of the
floor." Van Antwerp, supra, at 167; see also Neill, supra, at 177-78. Most of the companies in that
department applied for listing and "slow but steady progress" was made by the Exchange in
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the NYSE was financial disclosure.2" By the time the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was enacted, the NYSE required listed companies to submit their annual
financial reports to audit by independent certified public accountants,26 and
most agreed to submit quarterly reports as well.27 The NYSE thereby proved
itself able to extract certain behavior from issuers desiring to list their shares.
The competition had been tested cautiously and had not prevented such hard
bargaining by the NYSE.2"
The early emphasis on disclosure generated the first corporate governance
standard: annual stockholders' meetings.29 The exchange initially required
periodic publication of financial information, but over the next few years this
release of information was tied to the issuer's annual meeting.30 By 1909, listing
agreements required the issuer to publish certain financial statements prior to
obtaining commitments to qualitative standards from these companies. Teweles & Bradley, supra
note 17, at 106.
25. See Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., The Security Markets 236-56, 576-79 (1935) (describ-
ing disclosure-oriented listing standards developed in the 1920s); Meeker, supra note 17, at 96; S. S.
Huebner, The Stock Market 167-68 (Rev. Ed. 1934) (listing requirements of this era focused on
"publicity" of company activities and condition).
26. By 1931 the Exchange had persuaded 83% of listed companies to follow this rule, and in
1932 mandated the rule for all new listings. Teweles & Bradley, supra note 17, at 107.
27. See Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., supra note 25, at 591. Much of the progress in
persuading listed companies to make quarterly or even annual reports was made in the 1920s. See
id. at 590-91.
28. See Teweles & Bradley, supra note 17, at 109 ("In looking back over the period 1869-1934,
however, it is not difficult to see why the standards of the Exchange could progress no faster than
they did."). In language prophetic of the one share, one vote controversy that surfaced over 50 years
later, Meeker wrote in 1930:
[T]he Stock Exchange has and seeks no power over the corporations of the country. If it should
attempt to set itself up as a self-appointed censor of all American businesses, the Exchange
would invite and deserve public criticism. If its regulations with regard to listing should become
excessive and inequitable, they would soon prove valueless, since the corporations would refuse
to list their securities there. The Exchange can and does, however, employ moral suasion with
the corporations of the country, and thus has been all along an important factor in the
constantly rising standards of corporation ethics which are apparent in this country.
Meeker, supra note 17, at 97. Some companies, of course, were willing to sacrifice the "prestige and
the broad market that goes with [NYSE] listing" in exchange for less extensive disclosure
requirements. Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., supra note 25, at 236-37.
29. There is no date recorded for the first uniform requirement of annual shareholder meetings
that could be considered a "rule." The NYSE Listed Company Manual itself has referred to this
only as a "long standing policy." New York Stock Exchange Policies Re Proxy Rules 1 (Dec. 14,
1984) (unpublished report to the NYSE Listed Company Manual Board of Governors, on file with
author).
30. See Shultz, supra note 18, at 14.
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the annual meeting.31 Thus, the requirement of an annual report became
intertwined with the requirement of an annual meeting.
32
In the 1920s, the celebrated use of nonvoting stock resulted in voting rights
standards ultimately known as the "one share, one vote" rule.3 3 The NYSE
began listing nonvoting stock in 1925, and the ensuing criticism grew to "a
matter of general public concern." In response, the exchange indicated that the
next year it would give "careful thought" to the matter of voting control in
listing new issues. 34 It was not until 1940 that the NYSE "hardened and further
articulated" what could be considered a "policy" with respect to voting rights.35
What motivated the NYSE to develop these standards? The NYSE recog-
nized that "standards were good for [its] business," 36 and it pursued them as a
means to a competitive advantage. 37 The nature of that advantage, however,
must be stated delicately, for while a NYSE listing may be a "valued hall-
mark," 38 it cannot be used as an endorsement of the merits of a security. 39 A
31. Shultz, supra note 17, at 18 (discussing the 1909 listing agreements of American Woolen Co.
and E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co.).
32. The listing agreement was standardized at least by 1930 to require the issuer to submit a set
of financial statements "at least once in each year and submit [them] to stockholders at least fifteen
days in advance of the annual meeting of the corporation." Meeker, supra note 17, at 561.
33. For a comprehensive chronicle of the development of the New York Stock Exchange's
"policy" of refusing to list nonvoting common stock, see Seligman, supra note 14, at 693-99.
34. See id. at 693-97.
35. Id. at 699.
36. Livingston, supra note 17, at 179.
37. The NYSE during this period faced intense direct competition from the Consolidated Stock
Exchange, and to a lesser degree from the Curb Exchange (predecessor of the Amex) and some
miscellaneous specialty exchanges which developed in the 1920s. See Garvy, supra note 16, at 137-
40.
38. Livingston, supra note 17, at 179. The Exchange itself promotes the "prestige" of an NYSE
listing. See Shultz, supra note 18, at 85-86; see infra note 212 and accompanying text.
39. "The popular conception too frequently implies that when the New York or some other
stock exchange admits a security to its list it recommends that security for favorable consideration by
investors and speculators. This conception is entirely wrong." Huebner, supra note 25, at 151. "The
fact that a security has been listed on the Exchange cannot be considered as a guarantee of its value
nor as an endorsement or recommendation by the New York Stock Exchange." Twentieth Century
Fund, Inc., Stock Market Control 52 (1934).
Notwithstanding these disclaimers, this "popular conception" has proved resilient.
[Wje find inviting [the position] that to the American investing public listing on the New York
Stock Exchange carries with it implicit guarantees of trustworthiness. The public generally
understands that a company must meet certain qualifications of financial stability, prestige, and
fair disclosure, in order to be accepted for that listing, which is in turn so helpful to the sale of
the company's securities.
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975) (reversing dismissal of portion of
complaint alleging civil liability for violation of listing standards for notice of redemption to
convertible security holders). The resiliency of the popular conception may be due in part to the
occasional boost given by Exchange officials. See infra note 212.
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listing does, of course, confirm the legitimacy of the issuer and the security, 40 but
the NYSE's development of corporate governance listing standards, even in its
infancy, indicated a concern beyond assuring such basic requirements. The
exchange was "trying to see that stockholders' rights as stockholders were
protected against improper and dubious practices of investment bankers, bro-
kers, and managers of corporations, themselves." 4
1
The second period of modification of corporate governance listing standards
occurred during the 1950s. With one minor addition, the extension of minimum
voting rights to preferred stock in 1940,2 the NYSE's corporate governance
listing standards had remained essentially unchanged from 1926. In 1953, the
NYSE first announced its minimum quorum rules for shareholder meetings. 4
3
Beginning in 1955, the exchange required shareholder approval of acquisitions
that would result in an increase of more than 20% in the outstanding shares.
44
The requirement of two independent directors appeared in 1956.4' In 1959, the
NYSE mandated solicitation of proxies for all stockholder meetings.16 In 1960,
the NYSE strengthened the voting rights rules by requiring a shareholder vote
upon a "change in control" of the company.
47
The impetus for these changes appears to have been the NYSE's focus during
that time on bolstering trading volume. Trading volume had fallen by 1953, not
because of poor performance of the market, but because of the concentration of
40. See Huebner, supra note 25, at 152-53. Meeker appreciated this distinction when he
described listed securities as "strictly legitimate although frequently speculative." Meeker, supra
note 17, at 86.
41. Livingston, supra note 17, at 179.
42. Preferred stock was required to be able to vote for two directors in the event of default of six
consecutive dividends, and on all material changes to the charter or preferred stock agreement, for
which two-thirds approval was required. See Teweles & Bradley, supra note 17, at 108; Birl E.
Shultz, The Securities Market and How It Works 81 (A. Squier ed. 1963).
43. The minimum quorum rules originally appeared in the first edition of the NYSE's Listed
Company Manual in 1953. Letter from Paul Wyciskala, Managing Director, NYSE, to Douglas C.
Michael 2 (Feb. 7, 1991) (on file with author). Even today, the minimum quorum rules appear only
in the Manual, and not in the listing agreements. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, 3-6, 9-1 to
9-5 (1990).
44. 4 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 1827 n.269 (3d ed. 1990). In 1960,
this rule's measure was changed from number of shares to market value of the shares and "other
consideration" received. See NYSE, NYSE Chronology 1960 at 5 (1961) [hereinafter NYSE
Chronology] (unpublished annual chronology); NYSE Press Release 1 (Mar. 29, 1960). This
value-based measure was removed in 1989, as the NYSE found it difficult to value the "other
consideration," and the SEC, in approving the change, stated that it is "the issuance of securities
[which] is central to the transaction in question." Exchange Act Release No. 27,035, 54 Fed. Reg.
30,490, 30,491-92 (1989).
45. NYSE Listed Company Manual, 3-1 (1986).
46. 1963 Special Study, supra note 1, at 568. New York Stock Exchange Policies Re Proxy
Rules, supra note 29, at 4; NYSE Chronology 1959 at 4 (1960) (unpublished annual chronology).
Cannon Mills Company ultimately was delisted for failure to comply with this requirement. 1963
Special Study, supra note 1, at 568; New York Stock Exchange Policies Re Proxy Rules, supra note
29, at 4; NYSE Chronology 1962 at 1 (1963).
47. NYSE Chronology 1960 at 5 (1961); NYSE Press Release 1 (Mar. 29, 1960).
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shareholdings in institutional hands.48 The Amex, which had been more suc-
cessful than the NYSE during this time at increasing volume, may have
provided the necessary competitive motivation. 49 NYSE President Keith Fun-
ston began a campaign in the 1950s to court the small investor."0 He believed
that an emphasis on "corporate democracy" was essential to these investors.
5
'
While the Amex increased volume primarily by searching out new listings, 52 the
NYSE sought new investors for already-listed shares. 53 The listing standards of
the day were pitched with the individual investor in mind, heralded by the
NYSE as furthering "broader shareownership" 54 and "greater shareowner
participation in corporate affairs."
' 55
The third major change in listing requirements developed in the mid-1970s.
During this post-Watergate era, the Commission focused on questionable
corporate payments and corporate governance generally.56 As one method to
improve corporate governance, the Commission believed that each corporation
ought to establish an audit committee composed solely of unaffiliated directors.
57
The Commission staff had articulated legal grounds for a Commission rule
directly requiring such committees, 58 but it chose instead to suggest the idea to
48. See Robert Sobel, N.Y.S.E.: A History of the New York Stock Exchange 1935-1975, at 199-
200 (1975).
49. See id. at 199.
50. 1963 Special Study, supra note 1, at 561 (noting the scope of the NYSE's advertising
program "has increased dramatically during President Funston's tenure").
51. See Sobel, supra note 48, at 200.
52. "It would be misleading to say that [then Amex President Edward T.] McCormick's sales
efforts were directed primarily toward the public. Although he was more visible and accessible than
previous presidents, his road trips were taken to secure additional listings for the Amex, and not
new investors." Robert Sobel, Amex: A History of the American Stock Exchange 1921-1971, at 227
(1972).
53. The NYSE officially considered its efforts to be educational only, but its true purpose was to
bring new individual investors to the stock market. The NYSE claimed credit for the rapid increase
in the number of individual stockholders during the 1950s. See generally 1963 Special Study, supra
note 1, at 561-63.
54. NYSE Press Release (April 3, 1959) (release announcing mandatory solicitation of proxies,
quoting NYSE President Keith Funston).
55. NYSE Press Release 1 (March 29, 1960) (release announcing additional shareholder voting
requirements, quoting NYSE President Keith Funston).
56. See Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 42 Fed. Reg. 14,793, 14,794 n. 10 (1977) (discussing
the problem of "questionable or illegal corporate payments"); Seligman, supra note 1, at 534 ("The
1970s witnessed the most significant consideration of corporate governance reform since the New
Deal period."). In addition to the push for new listing standards, discussed infra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text, the Commission submitted to Congress a "Report on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices" which proposed certain legislative reforms. Seligman, supra
note 1, at 548; S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977). Those proposals became part of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977); see S. Rep.
No. 114, supra.
57. The Commission first expressed its belief in the independent audit committee some 35 years
earlier, but the concept had not spread quickly among public corporations. See Roberta S. Karmel,
Regulation by Prosecution 151 & nn. 36-37 (1982).
58. See id. at 153 & n.43; Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real
Issues, 36 Bus. Law. 173, 190 & n. 74 (1981) (both citing Opinion of SEC General Counsel on the
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the NYSE as a listing standard 9 applicable even to companies whose securities
were already listed.6' The NYSE dutifully complied, 6' and the Commission
approved the rule.
62
Although the NYSE did not develop this listing standard on its own initia-
tive, 63 it was not without competitive implications, since the exchange was the
only market to impose such a requirement. 64 The rule's mandatory impact,
however, was rather limited by the time of its adoption in 1977, as most listed
companies already complied with the rule. 65 Furthermore, the competing ex-
changes certainly were not opposed to audit committees. 66 Unlike the initiatives
of the 1950s, the NYSE was adopting a standard in response to an apparently
irresistible request.
6v
Commission's Authority to Require Public Companies to Establish Independent Audit Committees,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,535 (Mar. 2, 1978)).
59. See Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, supra note 56, at 14,794.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (indicating that listing agreements are not
uniform). On occasions such as the audit committee rule, the NYSE has created a rule of general
and uniform application, styled inaccurately as a "listing standard."
61. No commentator has suggested that the NYSE Listed Company Manual's action was in any
respect voluntary. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 58, at 190 ("[Tio characterize the New York Stock
Exchange's action as . . . voluntary . . . is unreal."); Karmel, supra note 57, at 152 ("The
voluntariness of the New York Stock Exchange's adoption of this rule is debatable."); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and
an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1274 (1977) ("[T]he SEC virtually thrust the
audit committee rule upon the New York Stock Exchange").
The approach of "suggesting" rules to the exchange is as old as the Commission itself.
Limitations on short sales originated as rules of the exchanges adopted at the "suggestion" of the
Commission in 1934. The Commission also followed this practice regarding rules governing floor
trading. Ultimately, both of these efforts were supplanted by direct Commission regulation in Rules
10a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1991), and 1la-1, id. § 240.11a-1. See Richard W. Jennings, Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 663, 672, 682-83 (1964).
62. See Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, supra note 56.
63. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64. The Amex initially refused a similar request by the Commission. See Kripke, supra note 58,
at 189-90. The Amex, however, now requires listed companies to have an audit committee of which
a majority must be independent directors. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (proposal to
make recommendations mandatory). The NASD did not at that time impose any corporate
governance standards. See infra text accompanying notes 90-98.
65. Eighty percent of listed companies had such committees by 1973, Exchange Act Release No.
13,346, supra note 56, at 14,794 n.9 (1977), and "almost 90 percent" by 1976. Seligman, supra note
1, at 547.
66. The Amex's refusal to make the audit committee rule mandatory was based on the smaller
size of the boards of directors of its listed companies. Kripke, supra note 58, at 190.
67. The NYSE had, however, "first suggested the concept of an audit committee in 1940, and in
recent years has strongly recommended [it]." Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, supra note 56, at
14,794 n.9.
1472 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 47, August 1992
After 1977, the NYSE focused on modifying its existing corporate governance
listing standards.6" No new initiatives were taken until the proposed repeal of
the one share, one vote rule which led to the recent controversy and the Business
Roundtable decision. The NYSE first proposed to repeal its voting rights listing
standards in 1985 in response to pressure from its listed companies, which were
eyeing competing markets without similar standards. The Commission desired a
uniform voting rights standard for all the markets, and when negotiations
among the markets failed, the Commission imposed a uniform standard with
rule 19c-4.69 Shortly thereafter, the NYSE independently adopted rule 19c-4 as
its own rule.
70
Amex
Corporate governance listing standards are a more recent development at the
Amex. Unlike the NYSE, the Amex did not take the fundamental step of
abolishing unlisted trading until 1934.71 The Amex's first listing standard, a
corporate governance standard, appeared in 1946, when the exchange deter-
mined, as had the NYSE twenty years earlier, "to consider applications to list
nonvoting common stock only on a case-by-case basis."
72
68. During this time, the NYSE's activities have been limited to rescinding or modifying
corporate governance listing standards and restricting the applicability of other standards to foreign
issuers. See Table 2.
69. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text (background of the one share, one vote dispute
and adoption of Rule 19c-4).
70. See Exchange Act Release No. 27,554, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,227 (1989). The impact of this
apparently technical move is clear after the Business Roundtable decision; although Rule 19c-4 is
invalid, its verbatim counterpart adopted by the NYSE still binds listed companies.
71. In 1934, 70 percent of all securities traded at the Amex were unlisted, comprising 82 percent
of all Amex transactions. Sobel, supra note 52, at 111, 129; see also Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.,
supra note 25, at 256 (Amex in 1933 traded about 1700 unlisted stocks (81% by number) and 400
listed stocks (19% by number)).
Not surprisingly, the Amex led the fight to permit the continuation of unlisted trading privileges,
which the original version of the Exchange Act would have abolished. See Sobel, supra note 52, at
110-13; Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 593 n.d (2d ed. 1988). Unlisted trading
was vital to the Amex's survival. See Sobel, supra note 52, at 111; Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.,
supra note 25, at 256 ("without the volume of unlisted trading, the [Amex] would not be able to
continue in existence"). The fight was successful, and the existing unlisted trading privileges were
"grandfathered" in § 12(f)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(3) (1988). Loss, supra, at 593
n.d; Exchange Act Release No. 21,498, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,156, 46,157 n.6 (1984).
There remain only a handful of Amex-listed securities grandfathered by the 1934 exemption.
Although the Commission recently has expanded unlisted trading on securities exchanges, it has
done so only with respect to securities designated as NMS securities. See Exchange Act Release No.
22,412, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,640, 38,646 (1985). The Commission initially limited each exchange's
unlisted trading privileges in NMS securities to 25 securities, id., but is considering a request to
increase the limit to 100 securities. See Exchange Act Release No. 27,178, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,067,
37,070 (1989). Furthermore, issuers of NASDAQ/NMS Securities are now subject to the NASD's
"listing standards." See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
72. Special Committee on Shareholder Voting Rights, Report to the Board of Governors of the
American Stock Exchange 4 (Feb. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Amex Voting Rights Report].
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Most of the Amex's listing standards were first set in the early 1960s, during
a comprehensive reform of the Amex.7 3 By then it was clear that the Amex's
campaign for more listings in the 1950s resulted in a higher quantity but
arguably lower quality of listed companies.74 The first "meaningful" quantita-
tive listing requirements imposing minimum public shareholdings and stock
prices came into effect in 1962,"5 and a stricter voting rights policy was
announced the following year.76 At about the same time, listing standards
requiring proxy solicitation and shareholder approval of certain stock issuances
first appeared.77 Minimum quorum requirements and a "recommendation" for
independent directors were part of the Amex listing standards by 1968."8
In the 1970s and 1980s, only minor changes were made to these standards.
Through the mid-1970s, the voting rights policy was further refined, 79 and
73. See generally Sobel, supra note 52, at 285-305 (discussion of revelation of scandals in 1960-
61 which led to a special SEC investigation, the resignation of most of the Amex senior manage-
ment, and complete reorganization of the Amex); see also Securities and Exchange Commission,
Staff Report on Organization, Management, and Regulation of Conduct of Members of the
American Stock Exchange (Jan. 3, 1962), reprinted in 1963 Special Study, supra note 1, at 751-813
(1963) (SEC report of general investigation of the Amex in response to the revelations of 1960-61 ).
74. See 1963 Special Study, supra note 1, at 771 ("The emphasis placed by the [American
Stock] Exchange on obtaining listings and the somewhat perfunctory administration of the flexible
listing policies are perhaps reflected in the quality of certain stocks listed on the Exchange."); see
also Sobel, supra note 52, at 233-34 (1972) (Amex President McCormick "had to make certain that
the new issues [listed on the Amex] represented more than a press agent's dream. On many
occasions, he failed to do so."). The failure to develop any meaningful listing standards was only one
part of the systemic problems at the Amex at this time. See supra note 73.
75. The Amex announced uniform quantitative listing standards in late 1961. Before that time,
the Amex had "'no rigid policy as to size of applicant corporations from the viewpoint of either
assets or earnings power.'" 1963 Special Study, supra note 1, at 770 (quoting American Stock
Exchange, Inc., Advantages of Listing (Feb. 1961)); see also Sobel, supra note 52, at 206 n.* (lack of
"meaningful" quantitative standards before 1962). The Amex's current quantitative listing stan-
dards, though concededly clear, are not necessarily of more binding effect. See supra note 15
(numerical standards "not always dispositive" of an application for listing).
76. "[T]he Exchange determined not to list nonvoting stock unless the holders were given the
right to vote in all cases in which the Exchange's rules require special shareholder approval." Amex
Voting Rights Report, supra note 72, at 4.
77. See Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 10,045-10,046 (1964). The "Listing Standards"
portion of the Guide, containing the cited provisions, was first compiled in the 1964 edition.
78. These standards appear in the first edition of the Amex Company Guide published in 1968.
See American Stock Exchange, Inc., Company Guide 5-6 (1968); Letter from Michael S. Emen,
Vice President, Amex to Douglas Michael (Jan. 21, 1991) (on file with author).
79. At first, in 1972, the Amex decreed that no nonvoting shares would be issued. Amex Voting
Rights Report, supra note 72, at 4.
This policy seems to have derived from pressure put on AMEX by state securities administra-
tors in the 1970s. Apparently, they indicated that they would favorably consider AMEX's
request for the granting of exempt status to its listed securities if it adopted the administrators'
current policies with respect to nonvoting shares.
Jeffrey Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common Shares-Their His-
tory, Legality, and Validity, 15 Sec. Reg. L.J. 37, 66 (1987).
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annual meetings were required in 1973.80 In 1980, the Amex "recommended"
that its listed companies have an audit committee composed solely of indepen-
dent directors."s This step was a response to renewed pressure from the
Commission after the NYSE adopted its audit committee listing standard. 2 In
1982, the Amex made miscellaneous changes to its requirements for shareholder
approval of the issuance of additional securities, 3 based in part on "changes in
the quality and timeliness of corporate disclosure and in the composition and
standards of corporate boards of directors which have taken place in the two
decades since [the rules] were adopted." 4 Several specialized listing standards
for unique types of securities also were developed during the early 1980s.
8 5
Within the last year, the Amex has undertaken several initiatives in the area
of corporate governance listing standards. First, it made mandatory its prior
''suggestion" that listed companies have an audit committee and at least two
independent directors.8 6 Second, the Amex recently approved a new voting
rights listing standard which would permit multiple class capitalization in many
cases prohibited under Rule 19c-4. 87 Although the Amex now proposes to have
a voting rights rule different from that of the NYSE and the NASD, ss it believes
In 1976, this strict policy was loosened somewhat to accommodate the listing of Wang Laborato-
ries, Inc., which switched its listing' from the NYSE. Amex Voting Rights Report, supra note 72, at
4. Hence, the Amex's voting rights policy became known as the "Wang formula." Id.; Seligman,
supra note 14, at 704-05.
80. The requirement of annual meetings first appears in the 1973 edition of Listing Form L. See
Amex Constitution and Rules (CCH) at 3591 (1973). Prior to that time, the Amex "d[id] not
require annual meetings of shareholder to be held on any particular date, but dlid] expect listed
Companies to hold regular annual meetings in compliance with applicable state or other law and
their by-laws." American Stock Exchange, Inc., Company Guide 181 (1968).
81. See Exchange Act Release No. 16,722, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,740 (1980). The NYSE Listed
Company Manual adopted a mandatory independent director rule in the 1950s, see supra note 45
and accompanying text, and an audit committee rule in 1977. See supra notes 56-62 and accompa-
nying text.
82. Exchange Act Release No. 16,722, supra note 81, at 24,741 & n.6.
83. See Exchange Act Release No. 19,240, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,541 (1982).
84. Exchange Act Release No. 19,087, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,899, 44,899 (1982) (Amex statement of
purpose of rule changes in release announcing proposed changes and requesting comments).
85. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 26,104, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,131 (1988) (rescission of
special rules for real estate investment trusts); Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg.
24,230 (1987) (waiver of certain listing standards for foreign issuers); Exchange Act Release No.
21,863, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,972 (1985) (listing standards for certain investment trusts, adopted in order
to list Americus Trust certificates).
86. See Exchange Act Release No. 29,796, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,953 (1991). The Amex retains its
existing "suggestion" that the audit committee consist solely of independent directors. Id. at 51,954
& n.6.
87. Craig Torres, Amex to Allow Unequal Voting Rights on Shares, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1991,
at B3. The proposed rule change has been filed with the Commission, see File No. SR-Amex-91-13
(June 12, 1991), but has not been publicly "noticed" by the Commission under Exchange Act
§ 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1988).
88. Both the NYSE and the NASD have adopted Rule 19c-4 as a rule of their own organization.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (NYSE); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text
(NASD). The Amex was unable to agree with the NYSE and the NASD on a voluntary uniform
voting rights rule, a failure which precipitated the Commission's proposal of Rule 19c-4. See
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that a uniform rule is "almost inevitable," and that its rule "would be appropri-
ate as a uniform policy" for all markets.8 9
The corporate governance listing standards at the Amex were thus born in
the early 1960s as the entire exchange was undergoing general reform. Those
rules have been marginally modified since then, but most dramatically in the
area of voting rights, where the Amex maintains distinctive rules while advocat-
ing uniformity among exchanges.
NASD
In 1985, the NASD first proposed "corporate governance" standards for
NASDAQ National Market System (NMS) securities 90 similar to those applied
by the NYSE and Amex.9 Ultimately adopted in 1987,92 the standards include
the submission of annual and periodic reports to shareholders, maintenance of
independent directors, maintenance of an independent audit committee, requir-
ing shareholder participation in certain corporate transactions and execution of
a "Listing Agreement."93 In 1989, these rules were expanded to require
shareholder approval of certain corporate transactions.94 Shortly after the Busi-
ness Roundtable decision in 1990, the NASD proposed and the Commission
approved a rule adopting the substance of Rule 19c-4 as a rule of the NASD.95
The NASD also modified its shareholder approval requirements to conform to
earlier NYSE changes to its listing standards. 9
6
Karmel, supra note 12, at 831 ("[T]he Amex refused to compromise its position," citing Exchange
Act Release No. 24,623, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665, 23,667 (1987) [hereinafter Proposing Release]
(NASD and NYSE "agreed on the general terms of a rule")).
89. Amex Voting Rights Report, supra note 72, at 3.
90. See supra note 9 (definition of NMS securities).
91. See Exchange Act Release No. 22,506, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,769 (1985).
92. The amendments originally were to Schedule D, Part II of the NASD By-Laws, and
required conforming amendments to certain rules under the Exchange Act. See id. at 41,769
(proposed change to NASD By-Laws) and Exchange Act Release No. 22,505, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,697
(1985) (proposed conforming change to Exchange Act Rule 1 lAa2-1), withdrawn, Exchange Act
Release No. 24,635, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,149, 24,149 n.6 (1987).
The amendments ultimately became ensnared in the Commission's reworking of the National
Market System (NMS) designation and transaction reporting rules, ultimately resulting in amend-
ments to: (1) the NASD By-Laws, Exchange Act Release No. 24,632, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,233 (1987);
(2) the NASD's Transaction Reporting Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 24,633, 52 Fed. Reg.
24,234 (1987); and (3) the NMS designation and transaction reporting rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 24,635, supra.
93. See NASD, supra note 10, § 5, NASD Manual CCH 1812, at 1573 to 1573-4 (1991).
94. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,433, 54 Fed. Reg. 1463 (1989).
95. See Exchange Act Release No. 28,517, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,626, (1990). The NYSE had done
the same thing, but its rule proposal was approved prior to the Business Roundtable decision. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text. The NASD rule was more limited than Rule 19c-4, as it
applies only to NMS securities, while Rule 19c-4 applied to all NASDAQ securities. Exchange Act
Release No. 28,517, supra, at 41,626. The effect of the NASD's action is the same as the NYSE's:
the rule remains binding on issuers of NMS securities despite the invalidity of Rule 19c-4.
96. See Exchange Act Release No. 28,232, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,346 (1990). For a discussion of the
NYSE rules, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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The NASD's motivation for adopting these standards was to obtain equiva-
lent status with the securities exchanges in the eyes of state securities regulators.
Because NYSE or Amex listed securities are exempt from registration under
most state "blue sky" laws, "[tihe NASD has made no secret of its desire to
achieve the same securities market exemption." 97 Indeed, the latest NASD
proposals were made pursuant to an express understanding with the state
regulators.
98
Summary: The Central Role of Listing Standards in
Marketplace Competition
It appears that corporate governance listing standards were first developed by
the NYSE in order to assure investors that a listed stock was a legitimate
investment with some protection against "improper and dubious practices."99 In
the 1920s, the "one share, one vote" policy developed in response to public
outcry against the use of nonvoting stock."° In the 1950s, the corporate
governance standards developed in response to the rise of institutional investors
and the decline of individual stock ownership. 0 ' Thus, the voluntary efforts by
the NYSE1 2 to develop corporate governance listing standards were undertaken
in order to capture or retain trading business and commissions for its members,
though a byproduct was to promote shareholder participation.
0 3
Only a few years later, when general reforms prompted the Amex to consider
significant corporate governance and quantitative standards, the NYSE stan-
dards already were considered the norm. The Amex was under considerable
pressure to demonstrate to the Commission and to investors that its standards
were meaningful. The perception was that "listing" at the Amex meant no more
in the 1950s than it did before the Exchange Act, when unlisted trading
dominated the exchange. The listing standards developed by the Amex were
essentially those of the NYSE, and for the same reason: to attract customers for
Amex members.
The NASD never has pretended that its corporate governance standards were
intended to do anything but keep customers for its members. The NASD deems
97. Seligman, supra note 14, at 707. See also Exchange Act Release No. 24,633, supra note 92,
at 24,234 (NASD believes that with corporate governance standards, "additional states will grant
NMS issuers an automatic exemption from blue sky laws.").
98. The NASD and the North American Securities Administrators Association have developed a
uniform model marketplace exemption from state securities registration requirements. This model
exemption incorporates Rule 19c-4. See Securities Act Release No. 6810, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,550,
52,551-52 (1988).
99. See supra text accompanying note 41.
100. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
102. This limitation excludes the 1977 audit committee standard, as it really was not the
NYSE's idea. See supra note 61.
103. See supra notes 54-55 (remarks of NYSE President Funston).
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it critical for NASDAQ/NMS "listing" to achieve the same status under state
law as an NYSE or Amex listing.
10 4
Thus, the genesis of these listing standards was an attempt by the NYSE to
obtain and keep individual investors in its listed securities, with the accompany-
ing business benefit for the NYSE members. In addition, the listing standards
adopted by other markets primarily were not only a competitive response to the
NYSE but also a response to pressure from the Commission and state regula-
tors."0 5 It is important to remember the origin of these rules because they have
taken on a life of their own, with their original intent long forgotten."0 6
Typically, they are vaunted as a bastion of shareholder protection.' 0 7 While that
may have been an incidental result, it hardly was the motivation for the
exchanges in adopting corporate governance listing standards.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS
AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The Exchange Act originally empowered the Commission to "alter or supple-
ment the rules of [an] exchange ... in respect of such matters as ... the listing
. . . of any security."' 0 8 Notwithstanding this authority, one commentator
maintains that "[u]ntil 1975, exchange listing standards were clearly the subject
104. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
105. As indicated above, the Amex was under pressure from the Commission. See supra note 73
and accompanying text. The NASD was under competitive pressure imposed indirectly by state
securities regulators. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
106. Given this history, it is interesting that the debate over the "one share, one vote" rule has
referred to the competition in listing standards as a "race to the bottom." See, e.g., Exchange Act
Release No. 25,891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376, 26,378 (1988). The early history of listing standards
follows the theories of Professor Fischel in rebutting the "race to the bottom" thesis, namely, that
exchanges compete for volume (not only number of listings, but trades as well), and that competition
motivates them to adopt rules which enhance shareholder welfare. Daniel R. Fischel, Organized
Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 129-30
(1987). The race for new listings apparently is the one toward the bottom; the race for more
transactions in listed securities apparently was one toward the top, or at least involved listing
standards which had the byproduct of shareholder protection. See supra text accompanying note
103.
107. Interestingly, it usually is the Commission which takes this view. See, e.g., Exchange Act
Release No. 24,939, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,657, 36,658 (1987) (stating in release approving Midwest
Stock Exchange, Inc. mandatory audit committee rule that uniform exchange listing standards
"assure investors that all the companies traded in those markets will have the fundamental
safeguards they have come to expect of major companies"); Exchange Act Release No. 24,633, supra
note 92, at 24,235 (stating in release proposing NASDAQ/NMS corporate governance standards
that "the exchanges have become accepted as sources of fundamental investor protections");
Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, supra note 56, at 14,795 (stating in release approving NYSE
mandatory audit committee rule that "the NYSE in particular has developed listing policies to
promote stronger standards of corporate governance"); Brief for Respondent at 33, Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter SEC brief] (characterizing
corporate governance listing standards as "a well-established scheme of [exchange]-mandated
investor protection").
108. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(3), 48 Stat. 881, 898-99 (1934).
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of private or contract law between an [exchange] and listed companies."' 0 9
Congress recognized in 1975 that, apart from scattered provisions such as the
one quoted above, "there is nothing in the Exchange Act which explicitly limits
or defines an exchange's rule-making authority,""'  noting that section 6(c) of
the Exchange Act permitted exchanges to have "any rule not inconsistent with
this [Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder.""' In addition, once an
exchange has been registered and had its rules officially reviewed by the
Commission, it "is free to change those rules at any time thereafter without
similar advance scrutiny or approval.""i 2
In the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments, Congress made three basic changes
to clarify the Commission's authority over the exchanges and the NASD and the
scope of those institutions' rulemaking jurisdiction. First, the statutory stan-
dards for rules of national securities exchanges and national securities associa-
tions (the NASD) were made identical."' Second, section 6(c) was repealed and
section 19(b) was added, requiring the Commission to review each new or
amended rule, approving it only if it "finds that such proposed rule change is
consistent with the requirements of this [Act] and the rules and regulations
thereunder.""' 4 Finally, section 19(c) was added, giving the Commission au-
thority to directly change the rules of an exchange or the NASD if the
Commission deems such a change "necessary or appropriate to insure the fair
administration of the self-regulatory organization,... or otherwise in further-
ance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act]. . .. "I"
Thus, Congress clearly had redesigned and streamlined the Commission's
authority over the exchanges and the NASD. This was done, however, with
primary focus on those organizations' powers over their members and with little
attention given to those organizations' powers over issuers of listed securities.
109. Karmel, supra note 12, at 828.
110. S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1975).
111. See id. at 27 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c), 48 Stat. 881, 886 (1934)).
112. Id. at 30.
113. In contrast to the "seemingly open-ended authority" given the exchanges under old § 6(c),
see supra note 111 and accompanying text, the provisions of the Exchange Act governing national
securities associations provided clear and comprehensive standards. The Senate Committee, in
discussing what ultimately became § 19(b) of the Exchange Act, stated that "the statutory pattern
governing the scope of the NASD's authority is basically sound. The bill would extend the pattern
now applicable to registered securities associations to exchanges." S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 27 (1975).
114. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1988). See S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
30 (1975). The requirement of an affirmative finding of consistency with the Exchange Act differed
significantly from § 6(c) of the previously existing law, see supra note 111 and accompanying text,
as well as from the House bill. The House version would have retained § 6(c) and added §§ 6(f) and
15A(f) to the Exchange Act, providing that stock exchange and NASD rule changes would
automatically become effective after 45 days unless the Commission disapproved the rule "as
inconsistent with the purposes of this title or otherwise inconsistent with the public interest." H.R.
Rep. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 16 (1975) (emphasis added). The Senate's version ultimately
was enacted. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 99-100 (1975).
115. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
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Hence, there remains some uncertainty about how the Commission should
apply its new powers to listing standards.'
16
The uncertainty created by Congress in 1975 concerning the Commission's
role in approving listing standards persists today. In approving listing stan-
dards, the Commission rarely explains its rationale. Instead, it routinely finds
that the listing standards in question generally meet section 19(b)'s "consis-
tency" requirement, being in each case consistent with Exchange Act Section 6
generally or Section 6(b)(5) specifically.' 17 In addition, the Commission never
exercised its section 19(c) power to write exchange rules with regard to listing
standards until the adoption of Rule 19c-4.1"
Because there was no further statement of Congressional intent and no
litigation to force further consideration of the question, the interpretation of the
1975 amendments was left to the Commission. In approving new listing
standards, the Commission did not face squarely the question of how such
standards might be "consistent" with the Exchange Act. No listing standard had
been adopted or amended in the public spotlight nor with any potential for
adversarial challenge." 9 It was not until the adoption of Rule 19c-4, thirteen
116. There even was scant reference to the NYSE's "one share, one vote" rule-the primary
then-existing corporate governance listing standard--during Congress' original consideration of the
Exchange Act in 1934. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The
1975 amendments clearly were focused on exchange regulation of members, not issuers.
Because of the unique system of self-regulation in the securities industry, the principal markets
for securities, i.e., the exchanges, are also the principal regulators of the activities of broker-
dealers using those markets. Meaningful reform of this country's securities trading mechanisms
will, therefore, be impossible unless there is also a reform of the method and manner by which
the self-regulatory organizations operate and in the way that the SEC oversees the performance
of their regulatory responsibilities.
S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
117. Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1988), requires that the rules of an
exchange be:
[D]esigned to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. to remove impedi-
ments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system,
and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest; and . . . not designed to permit
unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, or to regulate by virtue of
any authority conferred by this title matters not related to the purposes of this title or the
administration of the exchange.
Id. In approving rule changes by the NASD, the Commission instead cites to § 15A(b)(6), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1988), which contains almost identical language relating to the rules of
national securities associations. These releases are listed in Table 2. The Commission occasionally
refers to specific clauses in its releases. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, supra note 85, at
24,232-33 (discussing the "investor protection" requirement of § 6(b)(5)).
118. The Commission has exercised its § 19(c) powers only in two other areas: the partial
elimination of "off-board" trading restrictions, see Exchange Act Rules 19c-1 and 19c-3, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.19c-1 and 19c-3 (1991); and the multiple listing of options, see Exchange Act Rule 19c-5, id.
§ 240.19c-5.
119. Although some publicity accompanied the NYSE Listed Company Manual's audit commit-
tee rule in 1977, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, no exchange has adopted a binding
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years after the 1975 amendments, that the Commission first attempted to
describe the relationship of corporate governance listing standards to the pur-
poses of the Exchange Act, resulting in a court challenge to its new listing
standard.
RULE 19c-4 AND THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
OPINION
The long-awaited judicial review of corporate governance listing standards
was the curious culmination of an unusual process. This section reviews the
developments preceding the Business Roundtable lawsuit, and the court's cor-
rect holding and unfortunate dictum.
THE UNDERLYING "ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE"
DISPUTE
While Rule 19c-4 was proposed in 1987, its recent history begins in 1984,
when several corporations whose stock was listed on the NYSE proposed
capitalization plans in violation of the NYSE's so-called "one share, one vote"
rule. 20 Not relishing delisting some of its most widely traded securities, 2 the
NYSE instead declared a moratorium on enforcement of its rule, and created a
study group, the Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative
Listing Standards of the Public Policy Committee of the NYSE Board of
Directors. 22
listing standard with which most of its listed companies were not already in compliance. See, e.g.,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, supra note 56, at 14,794 n.9 (by the time of the NYSE audit
committee proposal, 93% of listed companies either had such a committee or had developed plans to
create one); Exchange Act Release No. 29,796, supra note 86, at 51,955 (release adopting Amex
mandatory audit committee and independent director rules recites that 85% and 93% of listed
companies, respectively, already comply with those rules); Exchange Act Release No. 22,505, supra
note 92, at 41,698 ("[Mlost [National Market System] companies already comply with the NASD's
proposed corporate governance standards").
120. Proposing Release, supra note 88, at 23,665; Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,
407 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Comment, Rule 19c-4: The SEC Goes Too Far in Adopting a One Share,
One Vote Rule, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1057, 1064 (1989). The primary motivation of those
corporations was to take advantage of the tremendous defense against takeovers which dual class
capitalization provides if the insiders hold most or all of the voting stock. See Seligman, supra note
14, at 701.
121. Seligman, supra note 14, at 700; Comment, supra, note 120, at 1064. Ultimately, 46
NYSE-listed companies adopted "disparate voting rights plans," Proposing Release, supra note 120,
at 23,666, including General Motors Corp., Hershey Corp., Dow Jones & Co. and Coastal Corp.
Karmel, supra note 12, at 817 n. 58; Seligman, supra note 14, at 703 n.81.
122. Proposing Release, supra note 120, at 23,666; Exchange Act Release No. 23,803, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,715, 41,715 (1986).
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The NYSE felt competitive pressure to loosen its requirements,2 3 for the
Amex had a more limited "one share, one vote" rule, 124 and the NASD had no
such rule at all.12' The Subcommittee recommended such a modification in
1985, and the NYSE sought formal SEC approval of the rule change in 1986.126
Approval of a self-regulatory organization's rule change ordinarily is a routine
matter, but not in this case. Not only was the matter handled directly by the
Commission rather than by the staff through delegated authority,'127 but the
Commission chose to hold public hearings on the proposal, a rare occurrence in
such matters. 128 Seven months later, the Commission proposed Rule 19c-4 for
comment, and it was adopted a year later, 129 with minor modifications mostly to
the effective date. 3 ' Rule 19c-4 adds to the rules of each stock exchange 3' and
the NASD a prohibition on listing stock of a company which "issues any class of
security, or takes other corporate action, with the effect of nullifying, restricting,
or disparately reducing the per share voting rights holders of an outstanding
class or classes of common stock of such issuer registered pursuant to Section 12
of the [Exchange] Act.' 1 32 The Rule provides two sets of examples of corporate
action, one presumed to be acceptable under this general standard,' 33 and the
other unacceptable. 3 4 The Rule delegates further interpretive power to the
exchanges and the NASD.'35
The Commission likely recognized that it would be breaking new ground
with a "one share, one vote" rule. In both the releases proposing and adopting
123. Exchange Act Release No. 23,724, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,529, 37,530 (1986) (citing NYSE
congressional testimony in 1985 on the pressure of "the national competitive environment")
[hereinafter NYSE Rule Proposal]; Proposing Release, supra note 120, at 23,666; Seligman, supra
note 14, at 700.
124. See supra note 79 (discussion of Amex rules).
125. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussion of NASD rules).
126. NYSE Rule Proposal, supra note 123, at 37,529-30.
127. The Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation has the delegated authority to
approve rule changes. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3(a)(12) (1991).
128. The SEC decided to hold public hearings because of "the significant issues raised by the
NYSE's proposal." Proposing Release, supra note 120, at 23,667. See also Karmel, supra note 12, at
818-19 (the SEC's decision to hold public hearings indicated "the importance and difficulty of the
issues involved").
In fiscal year 1987, the SEC received 205 proposed rule changes from the stock exchanges, yet
this NYSE proposal is the only one specifically cited in the SEC's Annual Report as the subject of
public hearings. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 53rd Annual Report 42-43 (1988).
129. Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376 (1988) [hereinafter Adopting
Release].
130. See id. at 26,385-87.
131. The two smallest registered national securities exchanges, the Intermountain and Spokane
Stock Exchanges, were not covered by the Rule. See Adopting Release, supra note 129, at 26,376
n.1.
132. Exchange Act Rule 19c-4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a) (1991) (applicable to national
securities exchanges). Identical language appears in subsection (b), id. § 240.19c-4(b), applicable to
national securities associations.
133. See Rule 19c-4(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d) (1991).
134. See id. at subsection (c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(c) (1991).
135. See id. at subsection (f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(f) (1991).
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Rule 19c-4, the Commission took the unusual step of discussing at length its
perceived statutory authority to adopt the Rule.'36 Not even the Commission's
other arguably controversial rules had been so discussed in the past.
13 7
THE INVALIDATION OF RULE 19c-4
Invoking Exchange Act Section 25(b), 38 The Business Roundtable brought
the validity of Rule 19c-4 before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. 39 In the language of the statute authorizing review, the
136. The issue first arose in connection with the NYSE's original rule proposal. In soliciting
additional comments and announcing public hearings on the rule proposal, see supra note 126 and
accompanying text, the Commission solicited comments generally on whether a uniform rule should
be applied to all markets and whether "the Commission or Congress should mandate such a policy."
Exchange Act Release No. 23,803, supra note 122, at 41,718.
Although this was not necessarily a solicitation of comments on the Commission's authority, 27
such comments were received out of a total of approximately 240 comments. Proposing Release,
supra note 120, at 23,667, 23,670. The Commission responded to these comments when initially
proposing Rule 19c-4. See id. at 23,674-76. Although the Commission solicited no further comments
concerning its authority, it received 32 such comments out of a total of approximately 300
substantive comments. Adopting Release, supra note 129, at 26,377 & n.23, 26,379. The Commis-
sion responded to those comments in the release adopting Rule 19c-4, see id. at 26,391-93, with the
same arguments ultimately used in the Commission's brief. Compare id. with SEC Brief, supra note
107, at 36-41.
137. For example, in 1984 the Commission adopted amendments to Exchange Act Rule lOb-4,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1990), which would prohibit so-called "hedged tendering" of securities. In
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986), the court
reversed a district court holding that an arbitrator's award to an investor was reversible because it
was in "manifest disregard" of Rule 10b-4. The Bobker court hinted, without deciding, that Rule
10b-4 "has no rational basis as a means of implementing the purpose of § 10(b)," and thus the
arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law when they refused the brokerage firm's defense
based on that Rule. Id. at 936. Later, in proposing and adopting amendments to Rule lOb-4 in
response to Bobker, the Commission did not separately discuss nor invite comment on its authority
to promulgate the Rule, but only noted that the Bobker discussion was dictum. See Exchange Act
Release No. 28,660, 55 Fed. Reg. 50,316, 50,318 n.23 (1990).
When the Commission proposed Exchange Act Rule 3b-9, defining banks as "brokers" and
"dealers" for certain purposes of the Exchange Act, it did not discuss its authority to promulgate the
rule. See Exchange Act Release No. 20,357, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,930 (1983). After receiving many
comments suggesting that it had no authority to adopt the Rule, the Commission briefly summarized
and refuted these comments when adopting rule 3b-9. See Exchange Act Release No. 22,205, 50
Fed. Reg. 28,385, 28,392-93 (1985). On appeal, the Rule was held beyond the Commission's
authority. See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The discussion in
the release adopting rule 3b-9 also was limited in comparison to the extensive discussions in both the
releases proposing and adopting Rule 19c-4.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1990), which states in pertinent part: "A person adversely
affected by a rule of the Commission promulgated pursuant to section... 19 of this title may obtain
review of this rule in the United States Court of Appeals ... by filing in such court ... a written
petition requesting that the rule be set aside."
139. The Business Roundtable, according to its brief, is an association of 200 major corpora-
tions, most of whom have publicly traded securities, and who are "directly affected by Rule 19c-4;
their stock would be banished from trading in the nation's public securities markets if they took any
action or issued any security prohibited by the rule." Brief for Petitioner at 2, Business Roundtable
v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Business Roundtable Brief]. The petitioner
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question before the court was whether "the Commission's action in promulgat-
ing the rule is . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction."' 40 The statutory
jurisdiction in question is that of Exchange Act Section 19(c),' 4' which required
the Commission in adopting Rule 19c-4 to conclude that the rule was "in
furtherance of the purposes of" the Act.' 42
First, the Commission alleged that Rule 19c-4 was valid because it furthered
the purposes of Exchange Act Section 14(a). 43 That section, according to the
Commission, is concerned with "fair corporate suffrage," and suffrage is unfair
when shareholders can be deprived of their voting rights "in a coercive or
involuntary manner."'14 4 The court, however, agreed with the Roundtable's
construction of section 14(a) as primarily directed at disclosure.' 45 The court
recognized that section 14(a) does authorize regulation beyond full disclosure,
but not to the virtually unbounded extent suggested by the Commission. 46
Second, the Commission alleged that Rule 19c-4 was valid because it fur-
thered the purposes of Exchange Act Section 11A, which states in subsection
(a)(1)(C) Congress' finding that "[it is in the public interest ... to assure ...
asserted standing on behalf of its members under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); see Business Roundtable Brief, supra, at 3. The question of
petitioner's standing was not mentioned by the Commission in its reply brief nor by the court.
140. Securities Exchange Act § 25(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(4) (1988).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988), provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from . . .the rules of a self-
regulatory organization ... as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the
fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of
this title and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organization, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. ...
Id.
142. Id. The Commission did not suggest that any of the standards of § 19(c) other than the
third were appropriate. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
143. Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988), which provides in pertinent
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person,... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, to solicit ... any proxy."
The Commission also alleged that Rule 19c-4 furthered the purposes of the Exchange Act
evidenced by § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1988), applicable to national securities exchanges,
and § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (Supp. 11 1990), applicable to the NASD, requiring each
to have rules that are designed "to protect investors and the public interest." Although the
Commission attempted to establish this as a separate justification for Rule 19c-4, all parties
recognized this as simply a restatement of the argument that Rule 19c-4 furthers the purposes of
§ 14. See Adopting Release, supra note 129, at 26,392; Business Roundtable Brief, supra note 139,
at 37; SEC Brief, supra note 107, at 39-40; Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413-14.
144. Adopting Release, supra note 129, at 26,391. The Commission demonstrated that share-
holders voting on a proposal to limit their voting rights may irrationally agree to do so because of
"collective action" problems. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411 (citing Proposing Release,
supra note 120, at 23,672).
145. Business Roundtable Brief, supra note 139, at 32-34, Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at
146. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411.
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fair competition among . . . exchange markets and between exchange markets
and [other] markets."' 47 Competition for issuer listings based on differences in
voting rights listing standards was viewed by the Commission as harmful, 48 but
by the Roundtable as potentially beneficial (and likely not within the intent of
section 11 A in any event). 149 The court finessed any decision on the benefits of
listing-standard competition, holding instead that these standards simply were
irrelevant to any of the purposes of section 11 A. 50
THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO RESCUE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS
The Business Roundtable court thus concluded that Rule 19c-4 was invalid
because it was not in furtherance of any stated purpose of the Exchange Act.' 5'
The court now realized the sweeping implication of that holding: the same
rationale applied not only to the Commission's rule, but to each one of the
exchanges' listing standards as well.'52 If the Commission cannot promulgate a
voting rights rule, asked the court, how could the exchanges have had such rules
in the first place?
If an exchange may adopt listing rules on one share/one vote or other
corporate governance matters, must it not (under § 6(b)(5)) rest those rules
on some relation to the purposes of the Exchange Act; and, if so, must not
the Commission's authority under § 19(c) encompass every aspect of those
rules?' 53
In answering this rhetorical question, the court proceeded to rescue in dictum
the exchanges' corporate governance listing standards from the fate accorded
Rule 19c-4.'54 Securities exchanges and associations may adopt rules which
have nothing to do with the Exchange Act, said the court, so long as they are not
enforced by power granted to that exchange or association by the Act, that is,
power over its members, not its listed companies.'55 The court stated that
because listing standards are not enforced by expulsion of or sanctions against a
member firm or associated person, they need not be related to any provision of
the Exchange Act.
156
147. Securities Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C) (1988). See Adopting
Release, supra note 129, at 26,392-93; Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 415.
148. SEC Brief, supra note 107, at 40-41.
149. Business Roundtable Brief, supra note 139, at 39-40.
150. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 416-17.
151. Id. at 416.
152. Or, in the court's language, it paused to consider "a puzzle in the relation between § 19 and
§ 6(b)(5)." Id. at 414.
153. Id. (emphasis in original).
154. See id.
155. Id. at 414-15.
156. Id.
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Thus the court solved the problem of original rules which an exchange or
association had upon its initial registration, governed by section 6(b)(5). 157 But
amendments to original rules are governed by yet another standard. Section
19(b) requires that any change to a rule of an exchange or association must be
found by the Commission to be "consistent with the requirements of [the
Act]." '58 It was clear by now that listing standards are "rules" within the
meaning of section 19.159 If the fact that a listing standard is inconsistent with or
simply irrelevant to the Exchange Act is no bar to an exchange's or association's
initial registration, then surely that inconsistency or irrelevancy would be fatal
if not removed when that rule is modified. Again, not to worry, said the court,
for the Commission's power under section 19 with respect to rules "which do
not regulate members and are not related to the purposes of the Act ... will be
quite limited." 16°
A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S RESCUE
In order to save the "one share, one vote" rule on a securities exchange or
securities association level, the court creates a "limited" standard of review
under sections 6 and 15A for original rules and under section 19(b) for
voluntary amendments to rules, each paralleling the limitation on the Commis-
sion's section 19(c) power stated earlier in the opinion.' 6 1 Upon closer examina-
tion, the court's attempt to rescue corporate governance listing standards is
noble but fruitless. The court's dictum is inconsistent with the 1975 amend-
ments to the Exchange Act and is unworkable.
157. See supra note 143. Section 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (Supp. 11 1990), has
identical requirements for the rules of a national securities association.
158. Exchange Act § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1988).
159. This is a fundamental issue, for if listing standards are not rules of the exchange, then the
Commission would have no regulatory power over them and presumably could not add a new
"rule" of this type pursuant to § 19(c). Fortunately, there is little disagreement on this point. See
Comment, supra note 12, at 1435-38, which characterized the question as "debatable," but
concluded that listing standards are "rules" under the Exchange Act. The Business Roundtable
pressed this interpretation with the court, see Business Roundtable Brief, supra note 139, at 23-25,
suggesting that no "rules" under the Exchange Act were involved. The court made quick work of
this argument. "It seems indisputable that the NYSE's proposed rule modifying its one share/one
vote listing standard is a 'rule' covered by § 19(b) and, correspondingly, that Rule 19c-4 does not fall
outside of § 19(c)'s ambit for any want of being a 'rule'...." Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 409.
Indeed, it was assumed from the beginning of this controversy that the answer to this question
was clear. The NYSE obviously assumed that its "one share, one vote" rule was a "rule" under the
Exchange Act, as it submitted its proposed amendment to the Commission for approval pursuant to
§ 19(b), setting in motion the events that led to the adoption of Rule 19c-4 and the Business
Roundtable decision. See NYSE Rule Proposal, supra note 123.
160. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414. In this context, the fact that the power is "quite
limited" means that the Commission will have limited power to disapprove the proposed listing
standard. See infra note 183.
161. See infra note 183.
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The 1975 Amendments
As indicated above, 162 the court attempted to justify its dictum by saying that
the 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act 163 recognized that consistency with
that Act is required only of rules relating to members, and that listing standards
do not relate to members. 164 Neither part of this statement withstands further
analysis.
First, the 1975 Amendments require all exchange and association rules to be
consistent with the Exchange Act. 16 The court's citation to legislative history
misreads those statements 166 and ignores the more numerous clear statements
granting the Commission plenary authority over all exchange and association
rules.
167
In the 1973 Securities Industry Study, 168 recognized by Congress as the
"genesis" of the 1975 Amendments, 169 the Senate Securities Subcommittee noted
the perceived regulatory "gap" between stock exchange rules and the Commis-
sion's supervisory authority. ° The Subcommittee recommended that the Com-
mission be given "clear and effective jurisdiction over all self-regulatory
rules,"' 7 1 adding its belief that "[t]he self-regulatory organizations exercise
authority subject to SEC oversight. They have no authority to regulate indepen-
dently of the SEC's control."'72 This clear legislative history escaped the
Business Roundtable court.'
73
The court also attempted to retain some ability for the exchanges and the
NASD to regulate issuers independent of Commission control by suggesting
that there was a substantive difference among the three statutory provisions
162. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 160.
163. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
164. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414-15 (citing S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1975)).
165. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
166. The court cites two excerpts of legislative history in support of its argument. See Business
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 415. Both passages suggest that Congress was intent upon limiting the
exchanges' authority over their members. Neither suggests that Congress intended to limit the
Commission's authority over stock exchanges themselves.
167. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, supra note 165.
168. See supra note 1.
169. See S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
170. See supra note 1.
171. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
172. Business Roundtable Brief, supra note 139, at 23 (emphasis added).
173. The court does not mention this passage, nor do any of the briefs. Both the Commission and
the Business Roundtable acknowledge that most of the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments is
centered upon regulation of the brokerage industry. See, e.g., Petitioner's Reply Brief at 14 & n.22,
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Business Roundtable
Reply Brief]. However, statements by Congress similar to that quoted supra text accompanying note
172 and the even clearer language of § 19(b) admit no such limitation. Whatever was "on Congress'
mind in 1975," see Bainbridge, infra note 181, at 600, Congress knew how to broaden its discussion
beyond the securities industry when it so desired. The Business Roundtable court simply failed to
recognize Congress' ability to speak generally in the midst of a report and legislation otherwise
focused on more technical aspects of the industry.
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governing: (1) Commission approval of original rules [section 6(b)(5)]; 174 (2)
Commission approval of voluntary rule amendments [section 19(b)];175 and (3)
Commission-imposed rule amendments [section 19(C)]. 176 Each of these statutes
uses somewhat different language in stating the applicable standard of review.
Section 6(b)(5) prohibits, upon initial registration of a national securities
exchange, rules which "regulate ... matters not related to the purposes of [the
Exchange Act]."' 77 Section 19(b)(2) requires, in order for a proposed rule to be
approved, that the Commission find the proposed rule "consistent with the
requirements of [the Exchange Act]."' 78 Finally, section 19(c) requires that the
Commission, when amending the rules of a stock exchange, do so in a manner
"in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act]." 179
Although these sections use different language, each is restating the same
standard for exchange or association rules. The Business Roundtable court
recognized that the section 6(b)(5) "related to the purposes" standard and the
section 19(c) "in furtherance of the purposes" standard essentially are identi-
cal.18° The section 19(b) "consistent with" requirement clearly is no different.
Although it may appear on first examination that a "consistent with" standard
permits listing standards which are irrelevant to but not inconsistent with the
Exchange Act, section 19(b) requires an affirmative finding of consistency.
Congress made clear that approval of a rule amendment under section 19(b)
would be appropriate only if "the rule was within the permitted purposes and
in conformity with the specified standards of the Exchange Act.'' t.. Congress
174. Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1988). For purposes of this discussion, only
§ 6(b)(5) will be examined. Section 15A(b)(6) contains identical language applicable to national
securities associations.
175. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1988).
176. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
177. Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1988).
178. Exchange Act § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1988).
179. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
180. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414. The court saves the ability of exchanges to adopt
standards under § 6(b)(5) by stating that they are not enforceable by members and thus not within
the scope of review of that section. The court thus necessarily determines that the § 6(b)(5) "related
to the purposes of" standard and the § 19(c) "in furtherance of the purposes of" standard are
substantially identical standards.
181. S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1975). This also is apparent when § 19(b) is
contrasted with the old language of the Exchange Act. See supra note 114. This reasoning, however,
is not uncontroverted. Equating "consistent" with "not inconsistent" is appealing, and many have
suggested it, including the petitioner in this litigation. See Business Roundtable Reply Brief, supra
note 173, at 16 (describing § 19(b) as "a standard under which a rule change must be approved if it
is not inconsistent with" the Exchange Act); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrec-
tion of Rule 19c-4, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 565, 597 (1991) (arguing that "regulating internal corporate
affairs . . . through . . . listing standards" is "not inconsistent with the [Exchange] Act," and
therefore these standards would be approved by the Commission under § 19(b), "but that is true of
all [rule] proposals that are consistent with the [Exchange] Act").
These clearly are defensible lexical or logical arguments. As the legislative history shows in this
instance, however, Congress chose to use different language in three different instances to describe
essentially the same standard. Were the legislative history not so clear, the use of different words
otherwise might be significant, as the above writers suggest.
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also stressed this requirement when it explained that the operation of section
19(c) "would give the SEC clear authority to amend any self-regulatory
organization's rules in any respect consistent with the objectives of the Exchange
Act."1
82
Thus, there is substantial if not complete overlap among the standards:
"related to the purposes," "consistent with" and "in furtherance of the pur-
poses". The result is that a listing standard, whether initially in place upon
registration of a securities market, later proposed by that market, or imposed by
the Commission, must meet the same statutory standard. The Business Round-
table court was incorrect in suggesting that the Commission could not write a
one-share, one-vote rule for the exchanges and the NASD, but that those
organizations could impose such a rule themselves. In each case the statutory
standard is the same, and the result should be also.' 83
Moreover, the court's dictum returns the securities markets to a state Con-
gress clearly intended to avoid. Before the 1975 Amendments, the exact scope of
the Commission's authority over the exchanges and the NASD was unclear.
Congress repealed section 6(c) Is4 and adopted sections 19(b) and (c) to remedy
this problem and to clarify the Commission's plenary authority over the ex-
changes and the NASD.1 5 The Business Roundtable dictum, however, leaves
the exchanges and the NASD free to adopt rules which the Commission is
powerless to affect, as long as the rules are not enforced against members. The
court thus resurrects a problem Congress laid to rest in 1975. t86
182. S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1975) (emphasis added). See also Lyman
Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 485, 545 (1991) ("lI]t seems
likely" that § 19(b) and (c) have identical coverage); George W. Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A
Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 725, 736 (1986) (language of § 19(b) and (c) is
"comparable").
183. Although the court suggested that "the Commission's § 19 powers will be quite limited,"
Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414, this does not mean that the court believes the standards are
the same under § 19(b) and § 19(c). If the Commission's § 19(c) power is limited-that is, it cannot
impose its own rules-then its power under § 19(b) to approve those same kinds of rules similarly is
limited. The court's holding and its dictum indicate that it intended different standards of
"relatedness" under these subsections, contrary to the intent of Congress as detailed supra notes
180-82 and accompanying text.
184. Section 6(c) permitted exchange rulemaking outside the scope of the Exchange Act. See
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
186. See also Johnson, supra note 182, at 546 (if § 19(b) is limited as in Business Roundtable
dictum, "it is not clear what SEC approval is supposed to add"). Others have suggested that the
exchanges and the NASD retain authority outside of the Commission's oversight. See Bainbridge,
supra note 181, at 596 n.143 (1991) (citing Business Roundtable Brief, supra note 139, at 24 (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 123, supra note 114, at 62-63)). The House Report cited, however, was referring to
the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 17 (1973), which concluded
only that the Exchange Act permits state regulation that is not inconsistent with federal regulation.
Id. at 137; H.R. Rep. No. 123, supra note 114, at 62. This clearly is different from the conclusion
that there is room for exchange regulation that is not inconsistent with federal regulation. In
addition, Ware relied upon the pre-1975 version of the Exchange Act, see Ware, 414 U.S. at 129,
and that language was changed significantly by the 1975 Amendments, see supra notes 110-15 and
accompanying text.
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Independent of the legislative history and policy of the 1975 Amendments, the
court simply is incorrect in its assumption that listing standards are not enforced
by an exchange or the NASD against its members. The ability of these markets
to force listing standards upon issuers lies in their ability to prevent their
members from trading securities not on their list.'
8 7
The markets are required by the Exchange Act to prevent unlisted trading.18 8
If a security is delisted, Exchange Act Section 12(a) prohibits transactions in
that security on the exchange.'8 9 If a security is removed from NASDAQ, it
may not be included in NASDAQ's quotation or transaction reporting sys-
tem. t 90 These rules clearly are binding on exchange and association members.
The exchange or NASD is required under section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act
"to comply with the provisions of this title [and] the rules and regulations
thereunder, and . . . absent reasonable justification or excuse [to] enforce
compliance" by its members and associated persons.' 9' Listing standards, there-
fore, clearly are rules ultimately enforced by the exchange or NASD against its
members, and under the Business Roundtable court's own analysis, those listing
standards must be subject to full review by the Commission. 92
Finally, other provisions of the Exchange Act suggest that the Commission
retains significant authority to review corporate governance listing standards
upon enforcement. A delisting by an exchange must be approved by the
Commission under section 12(d), which permits the Commission to consider
investor protection' 93 in its approval. Removal from the NASDAQ National
187. The Senate Report on the 1975 Amendments recognized this power.
[Tihe self-regulatory organizations exercise government power, and they do so in basically
three ways which may adversely affect the interests of particular persons: (1) by imposing a
disciplinary sanction, broadly defined, on a member or person affiliated with a member, (2) by
denying membership to an applicant, and (3) by requiring members to cease doing business
entirely or in specified ways with a particular non-member or with respect to a particular
security.
S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975) (emphasis added).
188. Unlisted trading was permitted by the NYSE until 1910 and by the Amex until 1934. See
supra notes 24, 71 and accompanying text.
189. Section 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1988), provides in pertinent part that "[it shall be
unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security . . . on a
national securities exchange unless a registration is effective as to such security for such exchange."
Section 12(d) makes clear that a security stricken from listing is also stricken from registration
within the meaning of § 12(a). See infra note 193.
190. See NASD Bylaws, Sch. D, Pt. III, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 1807 (1989).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(1) (1988).
192. It is only those rules which are not enforced against members as to which the court
hypothesized that "the Commission's § 19 powers will be quite limited." Business Roundtable v.
SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
193. Exchange Act § 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1988), provides in pertinent part:
[a] security registered with a national securities exchange may be withdrawn or stricken from
listing and registration in accordance with the rules of the exchange and, upon such terms as
the Commission may deem necessary to impose for the protection of investors, upon application
by the issuer or the exchange to the Commission.
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Market System by the NASD may be subject to Commission review, which
requires the Commission to pass on the subject rule's consistency with the
Exchange Act.194 The ability to make "investor protection" findings in a
delisting proceeding and the potential requirement of consistency with the
Exchange Act in a NASDAQ denial contradict the Business Roundtable court's
suggestion that the Commission has "limited" powers in this area.'
95
Practical Problems with the Court's Dictum
Not only is the "limited power" solution proposed by the court at odds with
Congress' intent, it is unworkable in at least two respects. First, it provides no
guidance to the Commission concerning its review of corporate governance
listing standards. Second, it removes a safe harbor from antitrust liability
previously enjoyed by the marketplaces but now unavailable in their unregu-
lated activities.
Id.
Under Rule 12d2-2(c), however, the Commission purports to avoid the necessity of any findings
by providing for automatic effectiveness of an exchange delisting unless the Commission elects
otherwise. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2(c) (1991). If the review of a listing standard adopted under
§ 6(b) or § 19(b) is limited in the manner suggested by the Business Roundtable court, then
presumably the Commission's ability to review the delisting under § 12(d) similarly must be limited.
This consequently would leave the above-quoted portion of § 12(d) without force and Rule 12d2-2
entirely superfluous.
194. The remainder of § 19 of the Exchange Act (not before the Business Roundtable court)
contains elaborate procedures for Commission review of self-regulatory organization actions. It is
possible that an issuer removed from the NMS against its will could, upon final action by the
NASD, petition for Commission review under § 19(f), claiming that this action constitutes "denial
of access" by the NASD within the meaning of that section. Section 19(f) requires, upon such
review, that the Commission find that the rules violated "are... consistent with the purposes of this
title." 15 U.S.C. § 78s(f) (1988).
Of similar import and history is Rule 11 Aa3-2(e), which provides for appeals to the Commission
of "[a]ny action taken or failure to act by any person in connection with an effective national market
system." Issuers specifically are included in the examples of "aggrieved persons" entitled to appeal
under this rule. See Rule 1IAa3-2(e)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1IAa3-2(e)(1) (1991). Subsection (e)(3)
of the Rule requires that, upon appeal, the Commission find that the rules violated "are . . .
consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets and the removal of impediments to, and perfection of the mechanisms of, a national market
system." Id. § 240.11Aa3-2(e)(3). Clearly, the review required under these provisions would be
even more challenging than that required under Exchange Act § 12(d). See supra note 193.
As with the rest of the 1975 Act amendments, these provisions-§§ 19(f) and 1 IA-were directed
primarily at self-regulatory organizations' dealings with their members. As a result, neither the
statutes nor their legislative history describes regulation of issuers. To date, these sections have been
applied only to market participants, that is, traders and exchanges. The legislative history of the
latter parts of § 19 contains no references to regulation of issuers. Although Rule I lAa3-2 does
mention issuers, the sole example provided by the Commission of the application of the rule's
appeals process is a dispute among marketplaces, not issuers. See Exchange Act Release No. 16,410,
44 Fed. Reg. 72,606, 72,610 n.47 (1979).
195. Although the court did once refer broadly to "the Commission's § 19 powers," see Business
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414, the court never discussed any subsection other than (b) or (c). The
court never considered subsections (d)-(f) or § 12(d) in its analysis.
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It is unclear how the Commission should implement the Business Roundtable
dictum if it so chooses. What "limited" standard ought it use in reviewing a
proposed rule if the standard of consistency with the Exchange Act is no longer
the norm?' 9 6 Should the Commission approve all such rules which are "not
inconsistent" with the Act?197 Such an approach is an appealing way to state the
Commission's "limited power" as found by the court. It is, however, an
interpretation squarely rejected by Congress in the 1975 amendments. 198 In
post-Roundtable decisions under section 19(b), the Commission has not ad-
dressed this issue.
199
Furthermore, the markets face an increased probability of antitrust liability
in any concerted action they may take. The lack of direct regulation by the
Commission under the Business Roundtable's new "limited review" standard
may preclude claims of antitrust immunity. Under settled judicial doctrines, an
"implied repeal" of the antitrust laws may exist if a court finds pervasive and
active review of otherwise illegal activity by a government agency which has
considered the anticompetitive effect of that conduct.2°° The Business Round-
table court's limitation of the scope of the Commission's section 19(b) review
196. The Commission, to date, consistently has ducked this question. After the Business
Roundtable decision, the NASD adopted Rule 19c-4 verbatim as a rule of the NASD, and
submitted that rule to the Commission for review under § 19(b). The Commission earlier had
approved an identical rule of the NYSE, but that action was taken before the Business Roundtable
decision. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
In approving the NASD's rule, the Commission noted that while the Business Roundtable
decision had invalidated Rule 19c-4, it then apparently ignored most, if not all, of the Business
Roundtable court's dictum simply by stating that the Business Roundtable court did not focus on the
scope of the Commission's § 19(b) authority, and that "[t]he Commission believes the analysis
contained in the release adopting Rule 19c-4 ... demonstrates clearly that the NASD's proposal is
consistent with the [Exchange] Act." Exchange Act Release No. 28,517, supra note 95, at 41,626,
41,626-27 & n.18. There were only three comments filed in response to this proposed rule, and
none questioned the Commission's authority to approve the NASD proposal. Id. at 41,627. The
Commission thus had no need to discuss in detail the scope of the "limited" review posited by the
Business Roundtable court.
197. This was precisely the interpretation suggested to the court in the brief of the Business
Roundtable and clearly rejected by that court. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 117, at 16. It
also was the language of old § 6(c) as amended by the 1975 Act. See supra text accompanying note
111.
198. The House bill would have allowed amendments to rules to become effective unless the
Commission found them to be inconsistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act; that version was
rejected in conference in favor of the present language of § 19(b). See supra note 114 (discussing
resolution in conference committee) and supra note 181 (discussing difference between "consistent"
and "not inconsistent" tests).
199. See supra note 196 (discussing NASD voting rights rule proposal). The Commission
shortly may have another opportunity to delineate the scope of its § 19(b) review, when the Amex's
new voting rights rule is submitted for approval. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Of
course, the Commission was rarely very probing with its § 19(b) review even before the Business
Roundtable decision. See supra text accompanying note 117. A similar opportunity may arise if the
Commission is called upon to review the removal of a security from listing or from NASDAQ for
failure to comply with qualitative listing standards. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
200. In Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court found such an implied
repeal and held that the NYSE's fixed-commission rules did not give rise to antitrust liability. The
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may have made it impossible for a court to make such a finding.2"' This does not
mean that antitrust liability automatically will attach, of course, 202 but that
Court stated the issue as "whether antitrust immunity, as a matter of law, must be implied in order
to permit the Exchange Act to function as envisioned by the Congress." Id. at 688. This statement
clarified the oft-quoted language from an earlier case, Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)
that immunity will be found only if "necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary," making it a legal inquiry and not a factual one. See
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 687; Thomas Linden, A Reconciliation of Antitrust Law With Securities
Regulation: The Judicial Approach, 45 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 179, 195-96 (1977).
201. See Johnson, supra note 182, at 546. In order for an "implied repeal" to be found, it is
important that the agency's review be meaningful, and that it include an analysis of competitive
effects. Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry
and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 475, 511-12 (1984);
Linden, supra note 200, at 214. See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 691-92 (Douglas, J., concurring), 692-93
(Stewart & Brennan, JJ., concurring) (each stressing the necessity of active review by the agency).
It may be possible for the Commission to steer this hazardous course successfully. It may be able
to limit its review of a rule for consistency with the Exchange Act, as required by the Business
Roundtable dictum, and at the same time justify any burden on competition, as required in any
event by Exchange Act § 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (1988). Alternatively, it may give the
proposed rule a full review, ignoring the Business Roundtable dictum. No one would complain if the
rule eventually were approved.
202. If no immunity is found, a myriad of antitrust law questions appear. Questions previously
finessed about the specific nature of the defendants' illegal conduct and the plaintiffs' right to recover
would become relevant.
A hypothetical plaintiff may be a company or shareholder whose security cannot be listed on the
NYSE or Amex or traded on NASDAQ for failure to meet those markets' qualitative listing
standards. The actionable conduct might be alleged to be a "group boycott" or "joint refusal to deal"
by the member brokers of the marketplace in question, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Alternatively, the activity of the exchange might be viewed unilaterally as the
anticompetitive activity of a monopolist actionable under § 2 of that Act. Id. § 2 (1988); see Gordon,
422 U.S. at 661; Silver, 373 U.S. at 345 (alleging violations of both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
An alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act likely would be subject to the courts' "rule of reason"
analysis, which would permit otherwise actionable conduct if "the beneficial effects of the conduct to
the statutory scheme [the Exchange Act] outweighed the negative effects of the conduct on free
competition." Smythe, supra note 201, at 514. An alleged violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act would
require proof of monopoly (shared or individual) or attempted monopoly with some conduct by the
marketplaces in furtherance of that monopoly. See 3 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust
Law 371-72 (1978).
Further, this plaintiff would need to prove some "conspiracy" among the markets in an action
under either §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. See id. This plaintiff also would need to prove some
antitrust injury, either to the corporation or its security holders, which may be difficult. See, e.g.,
Harding v. American Stock Exch., 527 F.2d 1366, 1366-68 (2d Cir. 1976) (individual and
derivative suit by holder of delisted securities alleging injury based on decline in market value of
shares); see Comment, supra note 12, at 1455-56 (while denial of membership to a broker-dealer
clearly injures that broker-dealer, "[Ijisting agreement restrictions do not effect similar restraints").
None of these antitrust issues have been addressed to date. The only case finding liability, Silver,
was concerned primarily with the lack of due process afforded the plaintiff, and the Court found "no
occasion . . . to pass upon the sufficiency of the reasons which the Exchange later assigned for its
action." Silver, 373 U.S. at 365. The other cases all have found an implied repeal of the antitrust
laws, and thus have not faced these questions. See, e.g., Gordon, 422 U.S. at 662-63; Harding, 527
F.2d at 1370.
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possibility may preclude the marketplaces from even considering rules which
might be upheld if challenged. 203
THE DILEMMA REVISITED
The Business Roundtable court clearly recognized a dilemma, but failed to
resolve it in a manner either practical to apply or consistent with the intent of
Congress. The dilemma exists in the following three statements, which all
cannot be true: (1) the Commission may not promulgate Rule 19c-4 (the court's
holding); (2) the Commission, the exchanges and the NASD are subject to the
same standards in their rulemaking; and (3) the exchanges and the NASD may
nonetheless themselves promulgate rules such as Rule 19c-4. To resolve this
dilemma, the court chose in its dictum to relax statement (2) above. 2° As
discussed in the preceding section, this is contrary to the 1975 Amendments.
The court never considered relaxing statement (3) in order to resolve the
dilemma. If statements (1) and (2) are correct, then the logical conclusion is that
the voting rights standards themselves may not properly exist under the Ex-
change Act's regulatory scheme. In short, the court's dictum should have read as
follows: if a rule does not relate to the purposes of the Exchange Act, then no
self-regulatory organization may promulgate it under sections 6, 15A or 19(b),
nor may the Commission do so for them under section 19(c).
Such a result, however novel, is consistent with the scheme of supervised self-
regulation, which is the heart of the Exchange Act. 215 The exchanges and the
NASD should be permitted to regulate issuers only in furtherance of their
ability to operate fair and efficient markets. Competition based on standards not
related to the trading of securities should not be part of that regulation because
it is unnecessary, confusing, 20 6 and distracts these institutions from their proper
roles of developing an efficient marketplace and regulating of their members.207
As the history of these listing standards indicates, they have no necessary
203. A 1971 study requested for the NYSE by William MeChesney Martin, Jr., known as the
"Martin Report," recommended that the NYSE's immunity from antitrust liability be made
explicit. Without such immunity, he argued, "exchanges face the choice of either regulating at their
peril, or not regulating at all .... This dilemma is an obvious deterrent to effective self-regulation
which must be remedied." Report submitted to the Board of Governors of the New York Stock
Exchange, reprinted in [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,184, at 80,563
(Aug. 5, 1971). The Report's proposal for immunity was considered but rejected by Congress. See
Smythe, supra note 201, at 500-02.
204. See Business Roundtable, supra note 119, at 414.
205. See supra note 1.
206. In operating their marketplaces, the "SROs are competing against each other in seeking to
attract participants to their respective markets. Reconciling the role of competing promoter with
disinterested regulator is not easy. This incongruous pairing of roles can only lead to confusion on
the part of the regulated, not to mention the SROs themselves." Miller, supra note 2, at 868.
207. Miller would limit the exchanges' and the NASD's jurisdiction even further in respect of
much of their oversight over members. He does not discuss listing standards directly, but concludes
that "(o]ne solution might be to redesign the regulatory structure to limit the SROs' purview to
market facilities. SROs would seem to be best able to deal with the problems of their market-
places ..... Id. at 885. At least with respect to SROs' listing standards, there is no need to "redesign
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relation to the protection of investors, having been adopted primarily to attract
new customers.
20 8
The Commission itself has recognized that corporate governance listing
standards are not closely related to its fundamental mission of investor protec-
tion. When the NASD's standards first were approved in 1987, the Commission
also approved a proposal by the NYSE and the Amex to waive most of their
corporate governance listing standards for foreign issuers.20 9 Both the com-
menters supporting these modifications and the Commission noted that, because
periodic financial disclosures are still required, waiver of the corporate gover-
nance standards "doles] not threaten the fundamentals of investor protec-
tion.
' 2 10
The harm caused by retaining invalid corporate governance listing standards
is self-evident. Issuers wishing to be free of these rules must face the prospect of
a delisting proceeding, with a clear challenge to the validity of the rules
unlikely. 211 The marketplaces may continue to trumpet their standards as
proxies for stability and soundness of their issuers, 21 2 and the states may
continue to rely upon such listing or trading for exemption from regulation of
the regulatory structure" as Miller suggests; that structure already exists in Exchange Act § 19, if
properly interpreted.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 103-105.
209. See Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, supra note 85, at 24,230. The standards waived
include "composition and election of the Board of Directors," "shareholder approval requirements
and voting rights" and "quorum requirements for shareholder meetings." Id. at 24,231.
210. Id. at 24,231 (remarks of supporting commenters). The Commission's own conclusion was
that "the Amex and NYSE Listed Company Manual listing standards which most directly relate to
investor protection are unaffected by the rule changes." Id. at 24,232. The NYSE has recently been
pressing for relaxation of some of the disclosure and accounting standards for foreign issuers. See
William Power, Big Board's-Donaldson Says SEC Rules Could Cost Exchange Its Global Standing,
Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1991, at CI, col. 2.
211. See infra note 227. Although many of these rules likely are considered inoffensive by most
issuers, that opinion could change over time. The voting rights standard, for example, was not
seriously challenged from its "adoption" in the 1920s until the mid-1980s, when it became
controversial. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. In the future, the rise of active
institutional shareholders may make the annual meeting and proxy solicitation listing standards as
contentious as voting rights listing standards became in the 1980s. See generally Edward B. Rock,
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445
(1991).
212. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. Consider, for example, the following recent
statement by the past President of the NYSE:
Someone asked me just the other day to explain the value of an NYSE listing. I answered him
with another question: "What is the value of that little star that juts up from the hood of a
Mercedes?" I was not being facetious. A listing on the NYSE is really a recognizable and
internationally accepted sign of quality, dependability, and reliability-both for the listed
company and for the investors who want to buy and sell its stocks in what most people regard
as the world's premier securities marketplace.
John J. Phelan, Jr., An Era of Opportunity and Challenge for The Securities Industry, in Market
Making and the Changing Structure of the Securities Markets 119, 127 (1985).
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the merits of or the disclosures given in an offering of those securities.213 A large
infrastructure would remain, based on rules which have no place in the current
system of supervised self-regulation and limited federal intrusion into corporate
governance.
To the extent these standards are necessary to protect shareholders, other
more proper regulators will supply them.2 14 These standards will thus be
developed not by marketplaces through listing standards subject to uncertain
and limited review, but by state or federal lawmakers and regulators, subject to
the traditional administrative and political processes. This is the proper place to
decide the extent of shareholders' rights.215
The correct answer to the Business Roundtable court's dilemma is that
corporate governance listing standards should not be permitted under the
Exchange Act. The next section examines the future of a marketplace without
such standards, and whether such a result is possible.
THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LISTING STANDARDS
A world without corporate governance listing standards would be quite
habitable. If the exchanges and the NASD abandon this area, others will step
in. The removal of such standards, however, may prove difficult; this responsi-
bility lies primarily with the Commission.
213. Most states currently permit securities listed or approved for listing on the NYSE or the
Amex an exemption from registration under state securities (Blue Sky) laws, and many extend this
privilege to NASDAQ National Market System securities as well. See supra notes 97-98.
Some of these exemptions may be in jeopardy with the demise of Rule 19c-4. In California, for
example, the legislature required that the NASD adopt voting rights rules "substantially similar" to
those of the NYSE and Amex and Rule 19c-4 before its National Market System securities could be
exempted from qualification (registration) in that state. See Cal. Corp. Code § 25100.1 (West Supp.
1991). Subsequently, after the Business Roundtable decision, the legislature directed each exchange
(and the NASD) whose securities are exempt from qualification under California law to file annual
reports with the Corporations Commissioner. The reports specifically are directed to discuss
"variances from corporate governance and voting rights' standards." Id. § 25100(o). The Corpora-
tions Commissioner is in turn to report to the legislature regarding the propriety of continuing any
of these exemptions. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 86, § 2 (West).
214. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
215. Johnson, supra note 182, at 547.
At bottom, corporate suffrage in the 1990s is not a dull, obscure subject to be gratefully
consigned to those stock exchange officials who can stomach it. . . . [Dlecisions about voting
rights should not be in the hands of those whose livelihood depends on high levels of trading
activity in corporate stock. The issue should be in the spotlight. It belongs in a legislative
forum.
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MARKETS WITHOUT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LISTING STANDARDS
Suppose a court held or the Commission stated that existing corporate
governance listing standards not consistent with the Exchange Act must be
abolished. No marketplace would be permitted to have or amend them, nor
could the Commission require them.
Such a rule effectively would abolish most of the corporate governance
standards listed in Table 1. It is possible that the rule requiring audit commit-
tees and independent directors216 could meet such a requirement; at least as
focused on the audit committee, such a rule most likely is consistent with section
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.217 The other standards, however, likely would
fail such a consistency test. The Business Roundtable court considered and
rejected arguments that these standards are consistent with sections 14(a) or
11 A of the Exchange Act.21s Although the court did not foreclose the possibility
that other sections might meet the consistency test, better candidates did not
present themselves then nor have they since.
219
216. This requirement is set forth as two rules, but there really is only one, because the required
audit committees must consist solely of independent directors. See NYSE Listed Company Manual,
3-1 (1990); Amex Company Guide, 1-12 (1992); NASD Manual (CCH) 1812, at 1573-3 (1991).
217. Section 13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1988), requires certain issuers, including
those listed on securities exchanges and traded on NASDAQ, to "devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls" subject to specified standards. A rule requiring an audit committee
likely would be consistent with those requirements. The Commission's push for the audit committee
listing standard in 1977 coincided with the enactment of this statute. See supra note 56. Professor
Coffee characterized the NYSE's audit committee rule as "a 'substitute' for direct federal regula-
tion." Coffee, supra note 61, at 1274.
The Commission's General Counsel opined in 1978 that § 13(b)(2)(B) or the Commission's
preexisting authority to regulate the independence of accountants and the preparation of reports
filed with the Commission would provide the legal authority for a rule requiring audit committees.
See Opinion of SEC General Counsel, supra note 58.
218. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
219. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (specifically
referring to Exchange Act § 14(d)-(f)). Though the Williams Act often is suggested as a likely
candidate, it would at most support limited regulation of certain actions in the midst of a tender
offer, see Dent, supra note 182, at 728-29, and even this support is not unwavering. See Bainbridge,
supra note 181, at 595 ("[Tlhe SEC has no authority under the Williams Act to regulate
substantively dual class transactions.").
Professor Karmel suggests that the Commission might also rely upon its authority in Exchange
Act §§ 14(e) and 23(a) to promulgate rules "reasonably designed to prevent violations" or
"reasonably related to the purposes of" the Exchange Act. Karmel, supra note 12, at 830. She notes,
however, that "Itihe extent to which such rulemaking could impose substantive fairness require-
ments that go beyond disclosure and exceed the requirements of state law is, however, a perplexing
question." Id.
Other historically broad bases of Commission authority, such as § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, would
be of little help in this area. The corporate governance standards in Table I are not clearly related
to the purchase or sale of the underlying securities, and in any event, the connection between § 10(b)
and corporate governance absent any connection to manipulation or deception was clearly severed
by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), and Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). See Thomas L. Hazen, The Law of Securities
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The maintenance of these standards would then fall to the Commission or to
the states.22 0 It is unlikely that the Commission could impose such standards
directly, because its power over issuers is limited to requiring disclosure and
suppressing fraud.221 The states currently mandate such standards, either indi-
rectly through exemptions from state securities registration for listed securi-
ties, 222 or directly through their corporation statutes. The scope and mandatory
effect of such direct regulation, however, is limited.223 A combined federal-state
Regulation 762-63 (2d ed. 1990). Professors Loss and Seligman, however, are critical of this
analysis, noting that "Business Roundtable does not clearly explain how it can appropriately export
limitations in Rule IOb-5 jurisprudence to § 19." 6 Loss & Seligman, supra note 44, at 2722.
If there are better candidates within the Exchange Act to support corporate governance listing
standards, they have escaped the scrutiny of many commenters upon the Commission's entire one
share, one vote adventure. Furthermore, it is likely that the Commission, which presumably knows
the Exchange Act well, put forth its best statutory candidates when called upon to do so in the
Business Roundtable litigation.
220. Congressional interest in the specific question of voting rights may produce specific narrow
federal rules in that area. Comprehensive federal legislation always is a remote possibility. A federal
corporation code is a perennial topic among academicians, but rarely among legislators. See infra
notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
221. The Commission's limited direct power over issuers is lodged primarily in §§ 10(b), 12(a),
12(g), 13(a)-(b), 14(a)-(c) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act. To the extent these sections support
disclosure requirements, they offer little as a basis for imposing corporate governance standards,
which clearly go beyond disclosure, though they may support limited measures such as an audit
committee. See supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text. The "antifraud" sections provide no
better basis, as "unfairness" or "coercion" simply does not fall within the proscription of an
antifraud statute, though there is disagreement on this point. See supra note 219.
Exchange Act § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1988), grants the Commission power "to make
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this
title." Thus, the Commission's own rules must relate to the Act, as must the rules of exchanges and
the NASD. The scope of the Commission's direct rulemaking power under § 23(a) may be broader
than that of the exchanges or the NASD under § 19(b). Alternatively, it is appealing symmetry to
say that if the Commission could promulgate a direct rule which passes muster under § 23(a), then a
similar exchange or NASD rule would by definition meet the "consistency" test of § 19(b). Neither
interpretation is confirmed or refuted by the legislative history. The quoted language of § 23(a)(1)
was in large part added by the 1975 Amendments; Congress did not indicate any intention to alter
the scope of the Commission's rulemaking powers in this regard. See S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 135-36 (1975).
222. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; Seligman, supra note 14, at 714 (noting the
"interdependence between the stock exchange and [state] blue sky rules").
223. Consider the Delaware law and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act as represen-
tative examples. See William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corpora-
tions 102 (6th ed. 1988). Both require annual meetings. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1983)
[hereinafter Del.]; Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 7.01(a) (1984) [hereinafter RMBCAJ.
Both provide rules for quora at shareholder meetings. Del. § 216 (supp. 1990) (minimum quorum
of one-third of shares eligible to vote); RMBCA § 7.25(a) (1984) (one-half of shares eligible to vote
unless corporation's articles or RMBCA provide otherwise). Both require one vote per share unless
the corporation's articles provide otherwise. Del. § 212(a) (1983); RMBCA § 7.21(a) (1984).
Finally, both require shareholder approval for new issue of shares in the case of a corporation
surviving a merger according to the same "20%" rule of the stock exchanges. See infra Table 2; Del.
§ 251(f) (Supp. 1990); RMBCA § 11.03(g) (1984).
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effort, possibly including Congressional action on voting rights,224 would fill
most, if not all, of the gaps previously filled by corporate governance listing
standards. 2
25
THE DIFFICULTY OF ELIMINATING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS
Unfortunately, however sensible this arrangement, it will be difficult to
obtain the judgment or rule hypothesized in the preceding section abolishing
corporate governance listing standards. The peculiarities of this business and
the law place this responsibility squarely in the hands of the Commission.
Inadequacy of Private or Congressional Action
Private litigants will be unable to mount an effective challenge to listing
standards. Since the time for direct review of the Commission's action will have
long since passed,226 a private challenger will be relegated to a collateral attack.
For example, a private challenger might raise the listing standard's invalidity as
a defense in a delisting proceeding. The marketplace's decision and the Com-
mission's review of it, however, could be based on any one of many alternative
grounds. The validity of the challenged rule likely would not be squarely
presented to the marketplace, the Commission, or a reviewing court.2 7
224. This probably is the broadest scope of Congressional action in this area. See infra notes
232-36 and accompanying text.
225. Notably lacking is any coverage of the exchanges' current requirement of proxy solicitation
for each annual meeting. It is possible that states would not hesitate to add such a requirement to
their corporation codes, as it has applied to NYSE-listed issuers for over 30 years. See supra note 46.
The rule may have little practical impact in many cases; corporations whose shares are widely held
may need to solicit proxies to assure that quorum requirements are met, and Exchange Act § 14(c),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1988), requires the same disclosure to all security holders as if proxies were
solicited.
226. A petition for direct review of a Commission rule must be made within sixty days after the
promulgation of the rule. Exchange Act § 25(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(1) (1988).
227. Enforcement would occur, if at all, in a proceeding to strike a security from listing on an
exchange or to remove it from NASDAQ. Such a proceeding would have numerous alternative
grounds, as exchange and NASD rules permit delisting upon broad "public policy" or "public
interest" grounds. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, 8-3 (1985), Amex Company Guide, 10-3
(1988), NASD Bylaws, supra note 10, pt. II, § 3(a)(3), NASD Manual 1810 at 1567-73.
Although the availability and scope of review of removal from NASDAQ is unclear, see supra
note 194, review by the Commission of an exchange's delisting is limited to an examination only of
the exchange's compliance with its own procedures. See supra note 193 (delisting requirements
under § 12(d) and rule 12d2-2(c); consideration of other issues permitted but not required); see also
Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming
Commission's review of a delisting which found only "that the rules of the Exchange relating to
delisting had been complied with"). If the Commission's order is in turn challenged in court under
§ 25(a), a further layer of deference would be added. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (court assumed without deciding that deference was due to
Commission's interpretation under its own statute). Thus, it is unlikely that the specific application
of a corporate governance listing standard to an issuer's conduct would ever require a court to
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The markets themselves likely will not volunteer to change their rules. Given
the perceived competition among marketplaces based on corporate governance
listing standards, 228 they have no interest in abrogating listing standards not in
furtherance of the Exchange Act solely for that relatively altruistic reason.
Many listing standards, if left alone, need not even comply with current law,
because they predate the 1975 amendments2 29 and, therefore, were not subject to
the "consistency" standard of section 19(b), which did not then exist.23 If such
listing standards have not been amended since their pre-1975 adoption and are
never so amended, then they never will be subjected to section 19(b) stan-
dards.
231
Nor is significant reform likely from Congress. Statements in the legislative
history of the 1975 Amendments concerning the markets' powers over issuers
are few and are overwhelmed by discussion of their powers over members. It is
possible that Congress did not concern itself with issuer regulation at all in
1975.232 Suppose Congress now desires to permit corporate governance listing
standards. It could permit the markets to promulgate whatever listing standards
consider the substantive validity of the listing standard itself and the exchange's or association's
authority to adopt the standard.
228. Such listing standards serve as a competitive basis for attracting issuer listings; this was the
impetus for the original NYSE Listed Company Manual rule proposal. See Adopting Release,
supra note 129, at 26,377; Seligman, supra note 14, at 701 & n.80. These standards also provide the
basis for state law "blue sky" exemptions, which is one of the major motivations for the NASD to
adopt its NMS corporate governance standards. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
In general, this theory of competition assumes that exchange listing standards which permit
"exploitation" of investors would ultimately result in lost trading volume. See Fischel, supra note
106, at 124. This competitive theory has its critics and limitations. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 9, at
69 (there are too few exchanges to permit any "effective competition"); Sobel, supra note 52, at
317 n.* (1972) ("investors and speculators [do not] care very much where the stocks they purchase
are traded.").
229. See infra Table 1.
230. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
231. Section 31(b) of the 1975 Amendments gave the Commission the authority to require
securities exchanges and associations to comply with the new laws immediately. Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-79, § 31(b), 89 Stat. 97, 170 (1975) authorized the
Commission, upon finding after notice and opportunity for hearing that the rules of a national
securities exchange or association do not comply with the Exchange Act, to suspend the registration
or place limits on the operations of such exchange or association. This authority continued for only
one year following the Act's effective date, and never was invoked by the Commission. The
Commission, however, was not required to so proceed. The conference committee report further
indicated the optional nature of such a proceeding.
[T]his provision [§ 31(b)], however, does not limit the Commission to suspending an ex-
change's or association's registration if an exchange or association rule does not comply with
applicable requirements. Rather, the Commission may, should it choose, institute a proceeding
pursuant to new section 19(c) with respect to the rule or rules in question.
H.R. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975). Thus, the fact that the old rules were not
challenged by the Commission under § 31(b) of the 1975 Amendments is not equivalent to approval
under § 19(b) of the Exchange Act.
232. "Corporate governance reform through SEC exercise of its 19(c) powers simply was not on
Congress' mind in 1975. Congress was concerned with modernizing the securities industry ... by
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they desire free from meaningful review by the Commission, in essence af-
firming the Business Roundtable dictum. Alternatively, Congress could make
clear that such listing standards do relate to the Exchange Act and thus affirm
the Commission's full oversight powers under section 19, in essence reversing
the dictum.233 Given the congressional concern over the one share, one vote
issue, 234 the surrender of federal control inherent in the first alternative is
unlikely. The second alternative is equally unlikely. Congress has indicated its
willingness to act in the corporate governance area, if at all, only a case-by-case
basis.235 Therefore, it is likely that any legislation resulting from the aftermath
of the Business Roundtable decision will be confined to a one share, one vote
rule, consistent with Congress' "surgical approach" to corporate governance
issues.
236
strengthening the SEC's regulatory powers with respect to the SROs and their member broker-
dealers." Bainbridge, supra note 181, at 600.
233. Commission Chairman Richard C. Breeden called for such legislation in recent testimony,
noting that the Business Roundtable decision "has created undue risks to a vital part of the checks
and balances that protect investors in national markets." Testimony of Richard C. Breeden before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs 29 (Oct.
17, 1991).
234. See Seligman, supra note 14, at 692-93 & n.37; Proposing Release, supra note 120, at
26,377 n.16; Peter N. Flocos, Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the "One Share, One Vote"
Controversy: An Epitaph for the SEC's Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1761, 1765 (1990). One
Senator stated in the course of related hearings at the inception of the one share, one vote
controversy:
I will be very candid .... It is no accident that I am introducing this legislation tomorrow [to
require a one share, one vote rule]. I am very much aware of the meeting that the [NYSE
Listed Company Manual, Amex and the NASD] will be having. Is it an inducement to let you
know that we are serious about this, and that there was a growing feeling of concern within the
Congress as a body, across political lines? Yes, absolutely.
Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1229 (1985) [hereinafter Corporate
Takeover Hearings] (statement of Senator D'Amato).
235. Proposals for federal chartering of corporations have surfaced in earnest several times in
this century, but have not been considered by Congress beyond the hearing stage. See Seligman,
supra note 1, at 545 (proposals in the mid-1970s); David S. Ruder, Corporate Governance: An
Analysis of Duties, Attacks and Responses, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 741, 752 (1979) (proposals of the
early 1900s). "For the most part, however, the securities laws have addressed specific problems
rather than corporate governance as a whole." Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate
Governance, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 545, 563 (1984). The calls for major federal corporate governance in
1934 were met with federal regulation of proxy disclosure. See id. Federal regulation of tender
offers by the Williams Act in 1968 stopped short of federal corporate governance. See generally
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). The broader inquiries of the mid-1970s
produced regulation of accounting and control systems in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
See Seligman, supra note 1 , at 545-48.
Thus, the Supreme Court has read Congress' intent on at least two occasions to be careful limited
action and not wholesale preemption of the states' role in corporate governance. See Dent, supra
note 170, at 1057-58 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) and CTS, 481 U.S. 69
(1987)).
236. Schwartz, supra note 235, at 578-79.
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The Need for Commission Action
The only remaining alternative is for the Commission to address the question
on its own initiative. In its review of proposed amendments submitted under
section 19(b), the Commission should begin immediately disapproving any such
corporate governance listing standards. In adopting section 19(b), Congress
envisioned that the Commission's review should be substantial "[w]ith regard to
rule changes which would have significant policy implications." '237 To date,
however, the Commission rarely has engaged in any substantive review in a
section 19(b) proceeding. 38 Such review is long overdue.
Although most corporate governance listing standards have never been subject
to section 19(b)'s requirements, 239 these rules are not beyond the Commission's
jurisdiction. They could be removed in a section 19(c) proceeding. Congress
made quite clear that any rule may properly be the subject of a section 19(c)
proceeding.21 Such a proceeding may prove difficult, however. The Commission
was instrumental through its "regulation by raised eyebrow" in creating some
of these corporate governance listing standards in the first place.24' The Com-
mission would be in the position of defending abolition of some commonly
accepted and traditional rules (holding annual meetings, proxy solicitation,
audit committees, and the like), not because they are unwise, but simply because
they are not in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. The process of
repeal, including public hearings required under section 19(c)(2) for any
It is .. .too sweeping to generalize that because Congress did not intend to enact a federal
corporation law, Congress renounced all interest in the functioning of the board [of directors of
a corporation] as it affected the substantive requirements of the securities laws. . . .Conse-
quently, governance reform in those pathological situations in which a court has found a
violation is not a subterfuge to enable the federal government to get a foot in the federal
corporation law door but is a surgical approach to an identified problem.
Id. Others have expressed concern about the scope of legislation in this area.
I think the kind of legislation we might then expect would not just relate to one share one vote.
It would relate to exactly what corporations must do, in terms of the Federal chartering of
corporations-Who should be on the boards and which constituencies do they represent? And I
think that's a very dangerous path to begin on.
Corporate Takeover Hearings, supra note 234, at 1228 (remarks of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman of
the Amex).
237. S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975).
238. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. The Commission's § 19(b) review of the
NASD's adoption of Rule 19c-4 as its own rule, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, was a
perfect opportunity for the Commission to begin such substantive review, but the Commission
declined to do so.
239. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
240. The conference report on the 1975 Amendments states that "the Commission may, should
it choose, institute a proceeding pursuant to new section 19(c) with respect to [any] rule or rules in
question." H.R. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975).
241. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 n.5 (1990) (citing Schwartz, supra
note 235, at 571, referring to pressure by the Commission on the NYSE that eventually resulted in
the NYSE proposal of its audit committee rule). See generally Kripke, supra note 58, at 189-92
(discussing many stock exchange rules which were adopted at the urging of the Commission).
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"interested persons," might be as highly-charged as the proceedings leading to
the adoption of Rule 19c-4. Although the Commission may be reluctant to
address these issues, such a proceeding is likely the only way to remove
corporate governance listing standards, 242 and remove responsibility for this
important area of corporate law from the nation's securities markets, where it
does not belong. 2
43
CONCLUSION
The development of so-called "corporate governance" listing standards over
the last century indicates a genuine concern on the part of the stock exchanges,
the NASD, and the Securities and Exchange Commission with the validation of
certain rights for holders of securities traded in those markets. We learned for
the first time in the Business Roundtable decision that those rules, however
venerable, are not valid because they further no purpose of the Exchange Act.
After so holding, the court rushed without principle or authority to save these
corporate governance rules, arguing that they somehow are beyond the reach of
the Commission's clear and unequivocal power to comprehensively regulate
national securities exchanges and associations. The court simply was unable to
reconcile the invalidity of such rules with their continued existence. The more
logical answer is that such corporate governance listing standards are indeed
invalid. All of these rules, however, may remain, binding virtually every large
American corporation for lack of a sufficient incentive on anyone's part to
remove them. Absent courageous action by the Commission, corporate gover-
nance listing standards will endure into the foreseeable future: a magnificent
monument without foundation, neither supported nor dismantled, but simply
suspended precariously in place.
242. The Commission has the power to proceed administratively against an exchange or the
NASD, but such a proceeding likely would be improper in this instance. In order to commence such
a proceeding, the Commission would have to identify some provision of the Exchange Act or
regulations thereunder which the respondent is violating by having such inappropriate rules. See
Exchange Act § 19(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(h) (1988). It is difficult to conceive of any of the Act's
provisions or rules which are being violated. There is no violation of §§ 6(b)(5) or 15A(b)(6),
because those provisions applied only at the time of initial registration. Even if such a proceeding
were legally feasible, it still would be unlikely, for the Commission has used such authority only
four times in its history. See In re Chicago Board Options Exchange, Exchange Act Release No.
26,809, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,413 (May 11, 1989); In re Boston
Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 17,183, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,659 (Oct. 1, 1980); In re Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No.
16,648, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,475 (Mar. 1980); In re San
Francisco Mining Exchange, 42 S.E.C. 1004 (1966), affd, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967).
243. See Johnson, supra note 182, at 547.
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TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT OF QUALITATIVE LISTING
STANDARDS ON THE NEW YORK AND
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGES AND
THE NASDAQ NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
Citation to Standards and
Dates of Original
Adoption
Standard NYSE a Amexb NASDc
1. Mandatory Annual Meeting
2. Minimum Voting Rights
Common Stock
302.00 704 5(e)
(1909) (1973) (1987)
313.00
(1926)
308.00
(1940)
Preferred Stock
3. Minimum Quorum
4. Independent Directors
5. Mandatory Proxy Solicitation
6. Shareholder Approvals
7. Audit Committee
122
(1946)
124
50)
(1990)
310.00 123 5(f)
(1953) (1968) (1987)
303.00 1 2 1d 5(c)
(1956) (1968) (1987)
402.04 705 5(g)
(1959) (1964) (1987)
312.03 710-713 5(i)
(1955) (1964) (1989)
303.00 1 2 1 d 5(d)
(1977) (1980) (1987)
a. Citations are to sections of the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (1990).
b. Citations are to sections of the American Stock Exchange Company Guide (1990).
c. Citations are to sections of Part III of Schedule D to the NASD bylaws, reprinted in NASD
Manual (CCH) 1808-1812 (1991).
d. Currently these are "recommendations" and not requirements for listing on the Amex. See supra
note 87 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING
STANDARDS OF THE NYSE, AMEX AND
NASD APPROVED BY THE S.E.C.
SINCE THE SECURITIES ACTS
AMENDMENTS OF 1975
Federal
Register
Market Vol/Pg. Date Listing Standards Approved
NYSE 42/14793 3-9-77 Audit committee
Amex 45/24740 4-3-80 Independent directors recommended
Amex 47/53541 11-16-82 Shareholder approval requirements
NYSE 49/11275 3-20-84 Conflict of interest rules (rescinded)
Amex 50/11972 3-25-85 Voting and nonvoting trust interests
Amex J 52/24230 6-23-87 Waivers for foreign issuers
NASD 52/24233 6-23-87 General corporate governance standards
Amex 53/38131 9-23-88 Rescission of special REIT standards
NASD 54/1463 1-9-89 Shareholder approval requirements
NYSE 54/30490 7-14-89 Shareholder approval requirements
NYSE 54/53227 12-20-89 Voting rights (Rule 19c-4)
NASD 55/30346 7-19-90 Shareholder approval requirements
NASD 55/41626 10-5-90 Voting rights (Rule 19c-4)
Amex 56/51953 10-8-91 Indep. directors, audit comm. required
